International Diplomatic Review Journal

Vol. 1, Issue 2, New Edition, September 2022

ISSN 2773 – 6598 PRINT

ISSN 2773 – 658X ONLINE

Published By Mozambique – Tanzania Centre for Foreign Relations

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EDITORIAL NOTE

International Diplomatic Review-Journal (IDRJ), Volume 1, Issue 2, 2022 is the second issue of the new edition of the IDRJ which comprises four carefully – selected research – based articles and a book review covering the field of International Relations, national and international security, conflict resolution and international trade. The Editorial Board was quite intentional in selecting manuscripts that are within the scope of the journal and which would add knowledge in the area of International Relations. Authors have managed to give their insights and critical analysis and propose scientific ways to provide solutions to real-life challenges. In the first article on Examination of Security Challenges in the East African Community (EAC) Region, the author critically analyses security challenges from diverse perspectives ranging from resource-based conflicts, climate change to organised crimes and maritime security. The study revealed that the current efforts done in the region are inadequate and proposed a comprehensive regional program.

The second article, Challenges of United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) in the contemporary Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) environment in Africa, uses the theory of PKOs collective security to analyse the challenges of UNMOs operations in the contemporary PKOs environment in Africa. The article identifies the current challenge as how to strike a balance between using force by one component of PKOs and the risks of Armed Groups' attacks on other components of the UN – PKOs who by the nature of their activities, are not supposed to carry weapons. The author notes that, although UNMOs were expected to be effective in addressing global conflicts using PKOs as a collective security tool, during the crafting of the UN charter, the security challenges we are facing today were not predicted.

The third article, The Role of Foreign Aid in the Dissemination of Civic and Voter Education in Tanzania General Elections 1995 – 2020, examines the extent to which foreign aid played a role in shaping the electoral practices related to the dissemination of civic and voter education in the past six multiparty general elections

conducted in Tanzania from 1995 to 2020. The author discusses the decreasing trend of funding from foreign donors and its relation to foreign interference in the elections process. The article suggests the need for Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) to establish election consolidated funds that will receive money from the government to ensure the availability of sufficient funds to conduct the exercise and ultimately limit the intervention of foreign donors in the dissemination of civic and voter education.

Finally, the review of the book, *African Security: An Introduction* authored by John Siko and Jonah Victor and published in March 2020 is broken down into sections and the author gives overviews of each section. The author identifies one of the major shortcomings of this book as the absence of a discussion on gender relations in African security.

The IDRJ editorial board hopes that after reading through the articles of this second volume, the readers will find it informative and significant in adding knowledge to various areas of International relations and welcomes submissions for the forthcoming issues.

Dr. Annita Lugimbana
Chief Editor

Examination of Security Challenges in the East African Community (EAC) Region

Abdulrahman O.J. Kaniki[1]

Abstract

It is well settled worldwide that the most basic purpose of the state is to make people safe or feel safe within their secured state thereby gaining confidence, reassurance, and predictability of life. Partner states in the East African Community (EAC) strive to individually and collectively ensure that the security and development of the region and its people is guaranteed. This paper seeks to critically examine the security challenges in the EAC region, which range from resource – based conflicts, climate change, and organised crimes to maritime security. Data was collected through documentary review. It is concluded that much as the EAC region faces security challenges, efforts are made to address them. However, given the dynamic nature of those challenges, the efforts seem to be inadequate. The author recommends the establishment of a specific organ dedicated to security, having regional strategic engagement to tap the marine resources, strengthening regional security initiatives, enhancing the implementation of the legal regime to address the security challenges, the need for regional multijurisdictional taskforces and joint operations and spearheading implementation of regional and international security strategies.

***Keywords**: conflicts, East African Community, sustainable development, security challenges, resources.*

1.0. Introduction

It is known that among the basic purposes of the state is to provide for the security of itself and its people. The aim is to make people safe or feel safe within their secure state thereby gaining confidence, reassurance, and predictability of life. Socioeconomic and political activities cannot be carried out effectively in an environment of insecurity. In this context, the importance of keeping states secure cannot be overemphasized. States in the EAC region, namely strive

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to collectively ensure that the security of the region and its people is guaranteed.

There is a need for a secure environment in the region because opportunities to advance sustainable economic growth and human development are increasing. However, much as the region is struggling to ensure that it continues to be safe, there are some security challenges, which, at times, threaten its very existence and survival. This paper seeks to examine these challenges and the legal provisions in place that are used to address the challenges in the region. Finally, it makes recommendations aiming at improving efforts to address these challenges.

2.0. Methodology

The study used secondary data obtained from a documentary review. It was a desk-based research work, which involved a review and assessment of various documentary sources containing secondary information related to the East African Community region generally and security challenges facing the region in particular. These sources included monographs, peer-reviewed journals and other forms of reviews, theses, dissertations, official reports and documents, textbooks, and regional legal instruments.

3.0. The Concept of Security in a Brief Historical Note

For a long time, the term security has been understood as the survival of the state and the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity from external military threats. It was simply seen to be the preservation of the state against external enemies and threats. From this understanding, the security of the nation was central and critical and was synonymous with state protection of its territorial borders, a defence against any foreign invasion, and maintenance of the political regime through military and diplomatic means. Conceptually, the more the state increased its military capabilities and diplomatic ties as well as influences, the more it was secure against external dangers. It was free from the threat of war and it felt safe from potential aggressors and remained assured of its survival.

However, changes in the types of threats as well as in the global political environment brought serious challenges to this traditional way of defining security in terms of the absence of war, the survival of the state, and the essence of military power in settling international conflicts. As such there was a need to adopt a broader definition of security to accommodate new emerging issues. This state of affairs is well summed up by Mihanjo (2015) in the following words:

> Noticeably, the definition of security has evolved. Its broad contemporary perception may be traced back to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The emergence of new threats such as environmental degradation, excessive poverty, human rights violations and domestic conflicts, terrorism, widespread criminality, natural disasters, diseases, starvation, and desertification, have led to a broader definition of security and the search for a more holistic and integrated strategy for human development. The traditional concept of security focusing on preserving the nation-state from foreign threats has been discarded. This has finally led to a shift from a State-centric view of security to a human-centric view of security. The human – centred view calls for a more global and flexible appreciation of all sources of human and people's insecurity, focusing on the human person, the promotion of human rights, improving living conditions, and ensuring survival.[1]

It is noted that global development and challenges that were apparent in the 1990s have caused a paradigm shift from the way security was viewed in the past. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989[2], the end of the Cold War in 1991[3] , and the opening up of

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[1] Mihanjo, E.P. (2015). "Perspectives of National Security: A Roadmap for Tanzania," *NDC Journal*, National Defence College-Tanzania, First Edition, July, pp. 8-12, at p.8.

[2] Westerhof, G.J. and Keyes, C.L.M. (2006). "After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Perceptions and Consequences of Stability and Change Among Middle-Aged and Older East and West Germans," *The Journals of Gerontology: Series B*, Volume 61, Issue 5, September, pp. S240–S247, p. S240, https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/61.5.S240. According to these authors, Almost 1 year later, on October 3, 1990, following the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany reunited. The end of the Communist era and the reunification of Germany started a process of rapid societal change in both former countries, especially in the

world economies in the 1990s necessitated by improvement of science and technology, globalization, and the general international movement toward free trade called for a broadened definition of security. That is the definition that takes a human – centric as opposed to a state – centric view.[4] It is in this understanding that security may be defined as the absence of all threats to human life, way of life, and culture while ensuring necessities.[5] In this approach, human security takes an upper hand when considering the whole security issue in a state. Its main consideration is the individual and the community rather than the state.

A citizen is an important aspect of the development of a nation or state. As such, security should ensure that all the human aspects of life are protected so that the human being attains development. This explains why the scope of human security should address such dimensions as economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security, water security, and energy security.[6] It is thus argued that human security has nowadays emerged to form a larger part of national security.[7] Noting from the foregoing analysis, it may, therefore, be underscored that any discussion on national security should consider human security, which encompasses all important aspects of human life.

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eastern part of Germany. A democratic regime and free market economy replaced the authoritarian regime and planned economy.

[3] Ahmad, I.(2017). "The Third World Perspective on the Cold War: Making Curriculum and Pedagogy in History Classrooms," *Journal of International Social Studies*, Vol.7 No.2, pp.121-135, p124.

[4] See Mihanjo, E.P. (2015), *op cit*., pp.8-9.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] For better understanding of some of these dimensions, see Kalanzi, A.T.K. (2020). "A Sneak Peek into the Environmental Security Sphere," *The Defender Magazine*, Senior Command and Staff College, Kimaka, Jinja, Vol.15 No.15, June, pp.28-31.

[7] Mjenga, O.R. (2016). "Tanzania's New Foreign Policy and its Contribution to National Security." *The Security Limelight, A Newsletter of the National Defence College-Tanzania*, Third Edition, July, pp.18-22, p.18.

4.0. The East African Community Region

By the time of writing this article, the EAC is an Intergovernmental Organization, which is comprised of seven partner states, namely Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania. Kenya and Tanzania are the only coastal states; the rest are landlocked. Through Kenya and Tanzania, EAC has a coastline of approximately 1,950 kilometers, a possibility of an outer limit of the Continental Shelf of about 164,520 square kilometers, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 383,541 square kilometers.[8] The EAC is not a federation. However, according to Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty, the ultimate goal of the Community is to have a federation government (political unification). The organization was originally founded in 1967 by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.[9] It collapsed in 1977. The following events were evident: Tanzania and Kenya set up autonomous harbor services; Kenya established its railway system; the East African Airways Corporation collapsed. Tanzania closed borders with Kenya, which ended the Common Market. Member countries could not agree on the General Fund Services budget; Consequently, Kenya announced its withdrawal and took over all EAC services operating in Kenya; eventually, the EAC ceased operations.

The main reasons contributing to the collapse of the East African Community included a lack of strong political will, lack of strong participation of the private sector and civil society in the cooperation activities, the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of the Community among the Partner states due to differences in their levels

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[8] Hamad, H.B. (2016). *The East African Community's Maritime Domain: An Innovative Institutional Framework,* PhD Thesis, University of Greenwich, United Kingdom, December, p.7, quoting Ruitenbeek, H.J., *et al.* (2005). *Blueprint 2050: Sustaining the Maritime Environment in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar*, World Bank, Washington. See also Hamad, B. H. (2016). "Maritime Security Concerns of the East African Community (EAC)," *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science,* Volume 15, Issue 2, July-December, 75-92, 75 and 76.

[9] The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Cooperation, establishing the East African Community, was signed in Kampala on 6th June, 1967. It came into effect on 1st December, 1967.

of development and lack of adequate policies to address this situation.[10]

The EAC was revived in 1999 when Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania signed the Treaty establishing the East African Community which came into force in July 2000. This tripartite initiative was geared toward having a community whose objectives were to develop policies and programs that aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner states in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security, and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit.[11] Looking at these objectives, it is apparent that the signing of the Treaty, which meant to bring back the original three partner states to cooperation, was one of the milestones in the integration processes and another attempt at cooperation whose ultimate goal is to establish a political federation.[12] It has been remarked that:

> "The signing of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community in Arusha, Tanzania on November 30th, 1999, its entry into force on July 7th, 2000, and the formal launching of the Community on January 15th, 2001 marked a culmination of seven years of committed efforts by the erstwhile East African Co-operation Member States of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania in re-kindling their tested long co-operation"[13].

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[10] See the Preamble to the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999 as amended on 14th December, 2006 and 20th August, 2007. For critical and detailed discussion on reasons for the collapsing of the EAC in 1977, see Walsh, B. (2015) "Human Security in East Africa: The EAC's Illusive Quest for Inclusive Citizenship," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol.37, No.1, May, pp.75-98, pp.77-79.

[11] Art. 5(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999 as amended on 14th December, 2006 and 20th August, 2007.

[12] Cichecka, A. (2018). "EAC-an Answer for Regional Problems or Failed Solutions in East Africa?", POLITEJA, 5 (56)/, pp.267-277, p.269. Source: https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.15.2018.56.15. Accessed on 9th November, 2021. POLITEJA is the Journal of the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University.

[13] Kaahwa, W.T.K. (2003). *East African Community: EAC Treaty and Challenges to the Community*, East African Community Secretariat Occasional Paper No.3, East African Community Secretariat, Arusha, p.1.

Given the above arguments, it is stated under Article 5 (2) of the Treaty that:

> "…[T]he Partner states undertake to establish among themselves and by the provisions of this Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and other relations of the Partner states to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of which shall be equitably shared."

In the bid to effect an enlargement of the community to have a large regional economic bloc, the three founders of the new EAC, welcomed new members, namely Burundi, Rwanda, and South Sudan.[14] Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full Members of the Community with effect from 1 July 2007. One Burundian once commented on the benefits that are in place for Burundi joining the EAC by stating that:

> This is a logical option because membership of Burundi to the EAC is first natural if we analyse both geographically and historically. Then the Community occupies an important place in the life of Burundi economically, politically, and socially. Burundi depends on the EAC for 95% of the imports and exports via the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. The Nairobi airport plays the same role in the transport of people.[15]

The joining of Burundi opened doors not only for economic prosperity but also for stabilizing the country at the political and security levels and providing the foundation for sustainable

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[14] See Amule, J.W. (2016). "The Role of EAC in the Stability and Development of South Sudan (RSS)", *The Security Limelight, A Newsletter of the National Defence College-Tanzania,* Third Edition, July, pp.86-87, p.86, who states that the EAC aims at strengthening its economic, social, political, technological and other ties for its fast growth and sustainable development.

[15] Nduwayo, V. (2015). "Burundi Economy in Regional Integration: Threats or Benefits of East African Community," *The NDC Newsletter, A Newsletter of the National Defence College-Tanzania,* NDC Course 3- 2014/15, pp76-78, p.76.

development that had lacked for years.[16] After all, the EAC is one of the fast – growing regional economic integration blocs in Sub-Saharan Africa.[17] South Sudan, which is the newest member, joined the Community on 5th September 2016 following its admission on 3rd March 2016 by the Heads of State Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania, and its subsequent formal accession to the Treaty.[18] The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has applied for membership.

As noted, according to Article 5(1) of the Treaty, the revived EAC has the objectives of developing policies and programs aiming at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner states in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, research and technology, defense, security, and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit. Now that the EAC is revived, the main task ahead is for the partner states to sustain the community so that it attains its objectives as stipulated under the Treaty.

4.1. Importance of Security in the EAC Region

It is well settled that regional integration allows partner states to cooperate in, among other things, security matters within their jurisdictions to protect their territories, sovereignties, and interests from imminent threats.[19] The EAC as a region sees the issue of security as a very important aspect of regional integration. One of the objectives, as stipulated under Article 5 of the EAC Treaty, is that the Community should ensure the promotion of peace, security, stability, and good neighbourliness within and among the Partner states.

Keeping the Region secure is a matter of concern because its very existence and survival depend on how it is secured. Security is among

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[16] *Ibid*., p.78.

[17] Gastorn, K., "The East African Community and the Sovereignty Relinquishment Trail in the Constitution Making Process of Tanzania," *Nyerere Law Journal*, Volume 1, 2014, 35-67, 38.

[18] EAC Secretariat (2016). *EAC Development Strategy (2016/17-2020/21),* p. 1.

[19] Anjalo, R., *et al*. (2018). "Nature of Security Cooperation and Regional Integration within the Jurisdiction of the East African Community," *Journal of Education and Science*, Vol.9, No.27, pp.60-66, p.60.

the prerequisites to political and socio-economic development within the region and vital to the achievement of the objectives of the Community.[20] That is why the Partner states have entered into several agreements aiming at fostering security and stability within the region. Good examples are agreements to combat drug trafficking, terrorism, and maritime piracy.[21] This shows that the issue of security is given an upper hand in realising the vision of the EAC, which is to attain a prosperous, competitive, secure, and politically united East Africa.

It should be noted that insecurity poses the greatest threat to development and poverty reduction not only in the EAC region but also in Africa as a whole. Arguably, serious insecurity and anxiety trouble citizens when a state is no longer able to guarantee the safety of its people. In this understanding, security is a precondition to attaining sustainable development in the region. A wider market with a combined population of over160 million people and a GDP of about US$ 170 billion shall remain untapped if security in the EAC region is not guaranteed. Thus, safeguarding the region against any insecurity threats is not an option but a matter of urgency.

5.0. Findings and Discussion

5.1. Security Challenges in the EAC Region

Based on what has been stated above, the EAC Partner states have been striving to foster and maintain an atmosphere that is conducive to peace and security through cooperation and consultations among themselves.[22] Such cooperation and consultations on issues about peace and security within the region touch on aspects of prevention, better management, and resolution of disputes and conflicts among themselves. All these attempts are done to protect the region and its interests from imminent threats. Hence, the security issue cannot in

[20] See Art.124 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
[21] Svicevic, M (Ed.) (2021). *Compendium of Documents Relating to Regional and Sub-regional Peace and Security in Africa,* 2nd Ed., Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, p.497.
[22] *Ibid.*

any way be underestimated. However, much as the Partner states have been striving to ensure that the region continues to be secure, there are some challenges, which threaten its existence and survival. Those challenges as revealed by various sources of information fall into the following categories:

5.1.1. Resource – based Conflicts

It is well known that resources are everything in attaining sustainable development in a society. Whether natural or otherwise, resources play an important role in people's livelihoods, poverty reduction, and economic growth. When resources are well managed and used sustainably, they make a direct contribution to poverty alleviation and improve human livelihood. That being the case, they play a critical role in food security, economic security, and sovereignty.

One of the reasons for the pressure attached to resources, especially in African countries is rapid human population growth, which calls for an increase in demand for food, grazing land, land for crop production, medicinal plants, timber, firewood, water, mining, and the like. As a result, everyone in scrambles for resources, which become scarcer, to make a living. As such, the main challenge is balancing the interests of all the people.

Given what has been stated above, what is needed is that all resources available be properly managed and fairly distributed to all citizens. Unfair distribution of resources has been a source of some internal conflicts within the states, which culminate into imminent security threats. The conflicts are due to scarcity and contestation over shared resources in terms of land use, including land tenure and property rights; regional and transboundary water conflicts, including issues of pastoral and ethnic conflicts; etc. Many conflicts in the EAC region can be linked to contests for the control of resources such as agriculture and grazing lands and water resources. As for pastoralists, it is argued that these people also clash over the use of natural resources such as water and grazing land for their cattle because of

cultural practices of heroism, cross-border and local livestock raiding, and a need for socio-cultural fairness.[23]

Depletion of pastoral grazing areas causes one of the bordering countries' pastoral communities to migrate to other areas, which leads to conflict between the newly arriving group and the main settlers. Also, due to the encroachment of pasture land by agriculturalists, there are repeated incidences of conflicts between farmers and herders.[24] Moreover, matters get complicated when cattle rustling is committed among the region's nomadic communities thereby posing a serious security challenge.

This kind of crime is no longer a traditional practice, but a form of organised crime committed by international criminal networks, which pose a significant economic threat and cause many deaths among rural communities and security forces in the region.[25] The proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the available ready market for cattle are among the facilitating factors to the commission of the crime.

Walsh (2015), who conducted a field study in the EAC region on human security, sums up hardships faced by members of the communities due to resource – based conflicts by stating that:

> "Inequitable distribution of resources, including water, has fuelled numerous group-to-group and group-to-state conflicts as communities and potential citizens fight for access to national wealth. The cattle rustling that has been rife in Karamoja and elsewhere sees a traditional mode of life struggling for recognition amidst the neglect of pastoralists and uneven distribution of grazing land by the central

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[23] Mengistu, M.M. (2015). "The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," *American Journal of Applied Psychology*, 2015, 4(2), 28-34, 32. Published online April 9, 2015 (http://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/j/ajap). Accessed 13 November, 2021.

[24] *Ibid*.

[25] Gunda, D.E.O. (2020), "Cattle Rustling: From Cultural Practice to Deadly Organised Crime," *ISS Today*, 28 February. Source: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/cattle-rustling-from-cultural-practice-to-deadly-organised-crime. Accessed on 31st January, 2022.

> government. Conflict and porous borders have helped produce a huge number of refugees in each country.[26]"

5.1.2. Climate Change

According to *the EAC Climate Change Policy, 2010*, climate change is a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over long periods.[27] It is a long-term shift in weather conditions identified by changes in temperature, precipitation, winds, and other indicators.[28]

Arguably, climate change is one of the most pressing global issues that have long-term implications for all countries' sustainable development.[29] From increasing shifting weather patterns that threaten food security to rising sea levels and extreme rainfalls that cause catastrophic flooding, climate change impacts are wide – ranging and unprecedented in scale.[30] Climate change has become an emerging challenging issue for many economies the world over. It has been insisted that:

> It is widely agreed by the global community that the world's climate is changing and will continue to change at unprecedented rates. Climate change is increasingly becoming a global concern as it poses a challenge to sustainable livelihoods, economic development, and

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[26]Walsh, B., *op cit*., p.80.

[27] EAC Secretariat (2010). *EAC Climate Change Policy*, p. v and Vice President's Office [Tanzania], *National Climate Change Strategy,2012*, p. xxi. This definition was adopted from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]. The Convention was adopted on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature on 4 June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. 154 nations signed the UNFCCC, which upon ratification committed signatories' governments to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases with the goal of preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth's climate system.

[28] National Bureau of Statistics (2019). *National Climate Change Statistics Report*, Dodoma, Tanzania Mainland, p. i.

[29] Apollo, A. and Mbah, M.F. (2021). "Challenges and Opportunities for Climate Change Education (CCE) in East Africa: A Critical Review." *Climate*, 9, 93, pp. 1-16, p.1. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli9060093.

[30] *Ibid*.

> global security. This concern is based on scientific findings and observational evidence provided in existing United Nations reports, IPCC reports, and other related documents on the impacts of climate change. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows an increase in global average air and ocean temperatures leading to widespread melting of snow and ice, as well as rising global average sea levels.[31]

EAC region is vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, especially floods, droughts, epidemics, and agricultural pests and diseases. These impacts pose serious challenges to the region's food security, infrastructure, economy, and ecosystems, to mention but a few.

According to *the East African Community Climate Change Master Plan, 2011-2031*, the main regional areas which have been identified and prioritized by the EAC Partner states, as being vulnerable to climate change are: (a) Agriculture (crops, livestock, and fisheries) and Food Security; (b) Water Security; (c) Energy Security; (d) Ecosystems Services and Biodiversity; (e) Tourism; (f) Infrastructure (buildings, roads, railways, waterways, and airways); (g) Human Health, Sanitation, and Settlements; (h) Trade and Industry; and (i) Education, Science, and Technology.[32]

The region has over time observed climate change adverse impacts through sea level rise, which has already led to infrastructure destruction along the coast, submergence of some small islands in the Indian Ocean, such as *Maziwe* and *Fungu la Nyani*, intrusion of seawater into freshwater wells along the coast in Tanzania, beach erosion in Mombasa, Kenya, as well as rampant floods and droughts across the region.[33]

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[31] Vice President's Office [Tanzania] (2012). *National Climate Change Strategy*, p.1.
[32] EAC Secretariat (2011). *East African Community Climate Change Master Plan 2011-2031*, September, p. 3.
[33] EAC Secretariat (2010). *EAC Climate Change Policy*, Arusha, May, p.1.

Given what has been stated above, one can note that adverse impacts of climate change relate not only to sustainable development but also to security. Because economic growth of the region depends much on such sectors as agriculture, livestock, forestry, water, tourism, transport, energy, and health, the adverse effects of climate change shall in those sectors shall lead to resource conflicts among members of the community. A good example is pastoral communities within the region.

The region's long history of altering droughts/flood cycles as well as the region's geography means it hosts an innumerable number of pastoral groups who have in centuries been moving and adapting to climate variability. With increasing population density coupled with development models that often pose a problem for security, pastoral communities are often under the threat of losing their livelihood and conflict with their settled neighbors. Okoti *et al* (2014) reveal in their findings of the study on the impact of climate change in the pastoralist communities of northern Kenya and their adaptation strategies when arguing that:

> There are…significant negative consequences including loss of livestock through heat stress or colder seasons; increase in animal pests and diseases; loss of land to agricultural encroachment as the rise in rainfall raises the productive potential of the dryland areas; an increase in the frequency of flooding, and the spread of human and livestock diseases that thrive during the wet season; declined animal performance such as growth, milk production, and reproduction… The results have been food insecurity in most parts of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands.[34]

In addition, large percentages of the region's population are subsistence farmers who rely on rain – fed agriculture as their primary source of income. With climate patterns becoming more

[34] Okoti, M. *et al.* (2014). "Impact of Climate Variability on Pastoral Households and Adaptation Strategies in Garissa County, Northern Kenya," *Journal of Human Ecology (Delhi, India)*, March, 45 (3) : 243-249, 243-244.

erratic across the region, drought and flood cycles severely affect both crop production and the movement of pastoralists.[35]

Based on the above discussion, it is obvious that climate change is increasingly becoming an EAC regional concern, which poses a challenge to sustainable livelihoods, economic development, and security. It fuels ongoing conflicts over access to natural resources within the region and beyond thereby causing imminent security threats. The main issue is the extent to which the region is prepared to let its people respond to climate change's adverse impacts.

5.1.3. Transnational Organised Crime

Transnational organised crime by definition concerns more than one country. According to *the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000*, an offense is transnational if, firstly, it is committed in more than one state, secondly, it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another state, thirdly, it is committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state, and finally, it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.[36] Recently, internationally agreed upon definitions of transnational organised crime have continued to emphasise, as its distinguishing characteristic, the notion that it involves cross – border criminal activity, violating the laws of more than one country.[37] This convention re – emphasises that a transnational crime is one where some elements of the crime will occur in or affect, more than one state.

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[35] EAC Secretariat (2010). *EAC Climate Change Policy*, *op cit*., p.9. See also COMESA *et al*. (2011). *Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Region*, November, p.10.

[36] Art. 3(2)(a)-(d) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000.

[37] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, A Dissertation Submitted to the National Defence College-Tanzania, in Partial Fulfilment of Requirements for the Master's Degree in Security and Strategic Studies in Addition to the Award of the Prestigious Symbol '*ndc*', Dar es Salaam, July, p.31.

Transnational organised crime is a global security threat, whose effects are felt worldwide. It wrecks the world economies, harms state – building and threatens human security and economic development.[38] As such, the EAC region is not spared. In the case of East Africa, this may involve locals colluding with others from outside the region – for example, Asian groups and other foreign nationals – or it may involve citizens of the region based in their home countries maintaining relations with expatriates living abroad[39].

Criminal groups are organised and structured to commit transnational organised crimes for profit. They have taken advantage of opening up economies to commit transnational criminal activities in the region. With the liberalisation of the economy and its attendant globalisation, several crimes of cross – border nature have begun to emerge.[40] This has been the case since the region has now been connected directly to the world economy. The increasing trade and cross – border activities in the Partner states have stimulated transnational crime.

On the same note, new communication systems and digital technology have made dramatic changes in our ways of life. Eventually, the improved communications technology has as well shaped the way transnational organised criminals use network structures to run their operations effectively and efficiently across the globe.[41]

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[38] Gobena, M.A. (2020). *Transnational Organised Crime and Peacebuilding in East Africa*, Wilson Center-Africa Program, Reasearch Paper No.27, 27, July, p.1.

[39] UNODC (2009). *Organised Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa*, A Discussion Paper For Discussion at the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Promoting the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern Africa Nairobi, Kenya, 23-24 November, p.13.

[40] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015). "Forfeiture of Criminally Acquired Property in Tanzania: Some Reflections on Historical and Socio-economic Factors," *Eastern Africa Law Review*, Issue No. 2, Vol.42, December, pp. 112-142, p. 127.

[41] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2014). "Proliferation of Counterfeit Products in Tanzania: A Threat to Human Security," *The Tanzania Lawyer: Journal of the Tanganyika Law Society*, Vol. 1 No.2, pp. 42-73, p.55.

Organised criminal groups in the region and beyond increasingly exploit information and communications technology to support operational activities. Such operations include sophisticated intelligence operations for gathering information on soft targets, reducing the groups' vulnerability, and identifying individuals they can corrupt for their objectives. In the course of such operations, the groups also make use of information and communication technology to conceal their identities to sneak through national boundaries.[42]

The crimes they commit include illegal drug trafficking and abuse; illegal immigration; human trafficking; money laundering; illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALWs); proliferation of counterfeit products; cybercrimes; terrorism, etc. Several factors make transnational organised crimes possible in the region. It should be noted that these factors do not cause organised crime but facilitate crime, or in some instances, they are criminal opportunities in themselves.[43] They include globalisation of the economy, increased numbers of immigrants, improved communication technology, corruption, porous borders and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and allocation of refugee camps along the borders.[44] A detailed discussion of each of these factors is given below.

a. The globalisation of the Economy

The opening up of the economy in the region in the 1990s saw several crimes of cross – border nature emerging since the region has now been connected directly to the world economy. Globalisation has impacted every aspect of life. It has eventually caused the world economy to undergo a profound transformation in terms of intensified trade and investment, increase in number and ease of financial transactions, growth in use of information technology, increase in capital and commodity mobility, and widened security cooperation.

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[42] *Ibid.*

[43] Finckenauer, J.O. (2000). "Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Crime," *National Institute of Justice Journal*, July, p.3.

[44] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, *opcit*., p.51.

All these have turned the world into a global village. Many countries have opted for open or liberalised economies to boost trade and become more competitive in the global marketplace. However, criminals have taken advantage of the opening up of the economies to commit transnational criminal activities.[45]

b. increased Numbers of Immigrants

Immigration has been taking place since time immemorial. Balzer (1996) argues that the number of immigrants has been increasing the world over due to the following factors:

i. Transportation systems have improved and expanded dramatically, particularly airline and automobile travel. International tourism and business travel are at record levels;
ii. Communication systems have improved and expanded, most notably satellite and fibre optic telephone and television transmission, fax transmission, and computer information storage, processing, and transmission;
iii. Many trade and travel restrictions between different parts of the world have been reduced or eliminated;
iv. The expansion of world trade which brings stronger participation by the economies of various regions of the world makes the world economic interdependence now a basic fact of life; and
v. The population has increased, resulting in more crowding, more areas of poverty, disease, and hunger, and large movements of people across national borders.[46]

The cumulative effect of these conditions is more people, more opportunities, more effective movement of people and information across national borders[47], and more opportunities and possible

[45] *Ibid.*
[46] Balzer, A.J. (1996). "International Police Cooperation: Opportunities and Obstacles," *Policing and Eastern Europe: Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Experience from the West, College of Police and Security Studies*, Slovania. Source*: https://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/int63.htm.*
[47] *Ibid.*

reasons for committing a crime. Among the people migrating, whether legally or illegally entering the countries, are criminals.

c. Improved Communications Technology

Admittedly, nobody on earth can deny the cross – cutting truth that new communication systems and digital technology have made dramatic changes in ways of life. Eventually, the improved communications technology has as well shaped the way transnational organised criminals use network structures to run their operations effectively and efficiently across the globe. One thing to be underscored at the outset is that improved communications technology acts as a bridge to connect different regions globally for facilitating activities that are geared towards committing transnational crimes.

Transnational organised criminal groups increasingly exploit information and communications technology to support operational activities. Such operations include sophisticated intelligence operations for gathering information on soft targets, reducing the group's vulnerability, and identifying individuals they can corrupt for their objectives. In the course of such operations, the groups also make use of information technology to commit identity fraud and sneak through national frontiers.[48]

d. Corruption

Corruption is another tool that facilitates the commission of transnational crime. Through corruption, transnational criminal groups co – opt government officials to mitigate the ability of law enforcement, regulatory, or other agencies that are directly responsible for interdicting or eradicating such criminal groups. It is argued that:

> In some countries, even if the state paid adequate wages, the state law enforcement sector may not be a legitimate alternative to the criminal sector. The institutionalized corruption of much of law enforcement

[48] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, *op cit*., p.53.

> and its close links with the criminal sector in some regions of the world means that the criminals can pay for specialists within and outside the government.[49]

Corrupt practices among law enforcement officers have largely caused transnational crime to thrive in the region. Security personnel fail to perform their duties after being bribed by criminals, who cross the borders with impunity.

A similar position was arrived at in the research previously conducted by Horwood (2009) under the auspices of the International Organisation for Migration [IOM] on *Assessment of the Irregular Movement of Men from East Africa and the Horn to South Africa,* where there is large scale movement of men from East Africa and the Horn towards South Africa through smuggling. Corruption and complicity of national officials appear to be one of the forces driving this regional international smuggling business, without which it would not be able to function as it does today.[50] It is thus no wonder to note that Al Shaabab terrorists in one instance bribed Kenyan police officers who helped them to smuggle explosives into Kenya in 2014.[51] The Kenyan government noticed this malpractice and thus

[49] Shelley, L.I. (2003). "Organized Crime, Terrorism and Cybercrime," in Bryden, A. and Fluri, P. (Eds.), *Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 303-312, at p. 305.

[50]Horwood, C. (2009). *In Pursuit of the Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity, Assessment of the Irregular Movement of Men From East Africa and The Horn to South Africa,* International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Geneva, p.9.

[51] See Daily News [Tanzania], March 4, 2015, p.8, where this ugly scenario was revealed by Head of Public Service Joseph Kinyua during the launch of an exercise that was aimed at reviewing systems, policies and procedures at ports of entry into the Kenyan country. Mr. Kinyua noted that after being bribed, the police at Kenya-Somalia border handcuffed the terrorists and escorted them all the way to Mombasa. This helped the terrorists, who were now suspects by the virtue of under police guard, to evade further scrutiny at various roadblocks. And after they arrived in Mombasa, the terrorists were unchained and let free to go ahead with their mission. The terrorists were later on arrested. The police who intercepted the vehicle bearing the explosives in March 2014 found six grenades, an AK-47 assault rifle, 270 bullets, six cylindrical bombs weighing 10kg each, five magazines, six detonators, a Nokia electronic cables. The in-built improvised explosive devices were welded to the floor and back seat of the vehicle. The explosives caused a

vowed to seal the gap through several initiatives that aimed at tightening immigration processes.[52]

e. Porous Borders

Vast and highly porous borders are among the factors that make transnational crime possible in the region. This observation is supported by the following factors:

i. Security weakness within the borders makes it easy for criminals to cross borders at will.
ii. An inadequate number of law enforcement personnel with insufficient resources.
iii. Few official entries and exit points along the borders with neighbouring countries but several unofficial exits and entries [panya[53] routes].
iv. Long extended borders enable transnational criminals to enter and exit.
v. Integration of the East African Community, which makes it easier for criminals to move from one partner state to another.
vi. Inadequate marine patrol vessels in the Indian Ocean and the lakes.
vii. Long, porous and uncontrolled borders, for instance, between Tanzania and the DRC and Burundi which covers 280 nautical miles in Lake Tanganyika and 262 kilometers on the mainland.[54]

It is disheartening to note from the findings of the research conducted by Horwood (2009) when assessing the irregular movement of men from East Africa and The Horn to South Africa along the borders that:

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crater when they were detonated. It was later on established who the police officers were and punished.

[52] Atta-Asamoah, A. (2015). *Responses to Insecurity in Kenya: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late?,* East Africa Report, Institute for Security Studies, Issue 3, April, p.6.

[53] *Panya* means 'rat' in Kiswahili language

[54] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, *op cit*, p.55.

> "…current trend of rising levels of irregular migration is set to continue, and movement will become easier as transportation and other technologies evolve. At the same time, most borders will remain porous and unmanageable due to size, geography and resources and……due to the failure of structures and controls to manage borders effectively."[55]

It is noted that porous borders create vulnerability to security threats to sovereign states all over the world. Those borders act as a free passageway for international criminals who crisscross porous borders with impunity. This, in turn, has created a security challenge to sovereign states and caused debates on how to strengthen border security globally.

f. Weapons and Allocation of Refugee Camps along the Borders

The proliferation of small and light weapons from some conflict/war-torn partner states and neighboring countries, such as the DRC is contributing to violent cross-border crimes such as armed robbery. This goes hand in hand with the allocation of refugee camps along the borders with neighboring countries. As a result of long time unrest in those countries, weapons, such as guns have been easily available in refugee camps and other parts of the Partner states thereby posing human insecurity.[56] It has been noted with concern that:

> "The problem of availability, misuse, and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons has for some time now been a major concern of the international, regional, and national communities. This is because such kind of proliferation is geared towards threatening public security, community development, and sabotaging economic growth. The Great Lakes Region has not been spared from this menace."[57]

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[55] Horwood, *op cit*., p.17.

[56] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, *op cit*, p.58.

[57] Ndiho, B. (2016). Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region: Source of Insecurity," *The Security Limelight, A Newsletter of the National Defence College-Tanzania,* NDC Course 4-2015/16, Third Edition, July, pp.51-53, p.51.

In the case of Tanzania, the most affected areas include Kigoma, Kagera, Katavi, and Rukwa regions.[58] The country suffers from the proliferation of small and light weapons not because of political instability but because of its vast and porous borders which are in contact with post – war/conflict – torn countries. More so, a study on the menace of illegal migration in Tanzania which was conducted by Mkumbo (2015) found that the presence of refugees in western Tanzania negatively affected environmental resources and water sources.[59]

It was revealed that many refugee camps were located relatively close to protected forest reserves, where refugees' cutting of trees for firewood and charcoal burning threatened vital natural resources.[60] Let it be noted at the outset that much as environmental degradation was a problem long before the refugees were allocated along those areas, the rate of deforestation accelerated greatly during their presence. Summing up the discussion on this category which contributes to bringing security challenges in the EAC Region, it can be argued that the rapid internationalisation of crime is a challenge for law enforcement not only in the EAC region but the world over.

Transnational organised criminal syndicates are becoming more and more powerful and universal, and their mobility is growing. They are nowadays adaptable, sophisticated, extremely opportunistic, and immersed in a full range of illegal and legal activities around the globe. It has been possible for them to do so because they learn and adapt and take advantage of changes that occur in the societies, be it in improved information and communications technologies or the

[58]Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, *op cit*, p.58.
[59]Mkumbo, C.O. (2015). *The Menace of Illegal Migration in Tanzania*, A Dissertation Submitted to the National Defence College-Tanzania in Partial Fulfilment of Requirement for the Master Degree in Security and Strategic Studies in Addition to the Award of the Prestigious Symbol 'ndc', Dar es Salaam, July, p.32.
[60] *Ibid*.

opening up of financial markets. Admittedly, transnational organised crime ring activities weaken economies and financial systems.

They undermine the workings of the free market economy. Due to their illegal activities, transnational crime groups have access to huge amounts of money, which needs to be "washed." This large scale money laundering has an impact on the operations of legitimate financial institutions that, in the long run, can go beyond the business sector with negative effects on the investment climate, tax revenues, and consumer confidence. In undertaking their illegal activities, transnational organised criminal activities pose a threat to partner states' socioeconomic and political wellbeing. They, therefore, upset the peace and security of nations worldwide.[61]

5.1.4. Maritime Security

Maritime security may be referred to as the protection of the maritime domain against unlawful acts or illegal activities such as piracy, illegal fishing, armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illegal trafficking by the sea, that is, drugs trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking, and human trafficking, cargo theft, and the like.[62] It refers to all the measures taken by a country or region to prevent unlawful acts in the maritime domain. Arguably, the maritime domain in the EAC region plays an important role in the economic development of all partner states. It is estimated that over 95% of EAC international trade by volume passes through Kenya and Tanzania seaports.[63] The EAC coasts are also sources of employment and means of living for a considerable part of the EAC population.[64] Moreover, the large oil

[61] Kaniki, A.O.J. (2015), *Transnational Crime and National Security: Issues and Options for Tanzania*, *op cit*, p.88.
[62] See Gesami, B. (2021). "Maritime Security Threats In Africa." *Academia Letters,* September 2021, Article 3564. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3564, pp.1-7, p.1. See also Hamad, B. H. (2016). "Maritime Security Concerns of the East African Community (EAC)," *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science,* Volume 15,Issue 2, July-December, 75-92, p.75.
[63] Hamad, H.B. (2016). *The East African Community's Maritime Domain: An Innovative Institutional Framework,* PhD Thesis, *op cit*., p.10.
[64]*Ibid*., p.9.

and gas discoveries in the EAC maritime domain offer potential energy security assurance to the community and beyond.[65]

Given the above, it is apparent that the EAC maritime domain provides economic opportunities to the local population and foreign investors. However, just like all the world's maritime domains, the EAC maritime domain is vulnerable to maritime security threats.
It is mostly affected by piracy, armed robbery against ships, smuggling of illicit drugs, small and light weapons, human trafficking, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, environmental destruction, and Kenya – Somali maritime border dispute, thereby posing security challenging threats in the region.[66] Much needs to be done to secure the EAC maritime domain, as the following findings by one researcher reveal that the maritime domain of the East African Community (EAC) is affected by several maritime security threats, including piracy, armed robbery against ships, and an on – going maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia.

Neither the EAC nor its member States have long term and holistic maritime security policies. Maritime security is dealt with in an ad hoc, case by case manner, mainly by individual states. This study has found that the lack of regional maritime security policies, more importantly, maritime security strategy, and the absence of a maritime institutional framework at the community level, appear to be major setbacks to regional maritime security efforts.

Additionally, the EAC depends on its member states and interregional and international maritime security programs which currently offer a significant boost to EAC maritime security governance. Nonetheless, an EAC maritime security strategy would formalise and customise all of these strategies to match with regional maritime security needs.

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[65] *Ibid*.

[66] For some detailed information on the Kenya-Somali maritime border dispute and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, which was delivered on 12th October 2021, see Gesami, B. and Kasembeli, G. (2021). "The East African Maritime Domain Dispute: The Case of Kenya and Somalia," *Academia Letters, November,* Article 3866, https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3866, pp.1-9.

Moreover, it would provide a forum for communication and cooperation among maritime stakeholders.[67]

This being the situation, the EAC region has to come up with collective, realistic, and workable strategies that will address those challenging security threats to the maritime domain. Holistic, as opposed to peace meal approaches, should be put in place. This includes combining all efforts such as regional and worldwide public and private maritime security operations.

5. The EAC Legal Regime

The discussion now looks at the legal regime, which is referred to in addressing the above outlined security challenges in the EAC region. It needs to be appreciated that law is one of the powerful and indispensable instruments to address the security challenges in the region. The main source of the EAC law is *the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999*. There are also protocols, which supplement the Treaty.[68] They form an integral part of the Treaty.[69] The Protocols are concluded by the Partner states to deal with specific aspects as envisaged in the Treaty. They spell out the objectives, scope, and institutional mechanisms for cooperation and integration in agreed areas, including how to address the above discussed security challenges.[70]

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[67] Hamad, H.B. (2016). "Maritime Security Concerns of the East African Community (EAC)," *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science,* Volume 15,Issue 2, July-December, 75-92, 75.

[68] See for example, Art.43 of the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management, 2006, which provides that the Protocol supplements the Treaty. It neither modifies nor amends the Treaty. In case of any inconsistency between this Protocol and the Treaty, the Treaty prevails.

[69]Art.151(4) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

[70] Art.151(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. The Treaty provides under Article 5(3)(f) that Partner states are to promote peace, security, and stability within, and good neighbourliness among themselves. It means that peace and security are given an upper hand within the region.

Regarding resource – based conflicts as posing security threats in the region, the EAC legal framework addresses them. Managing shared resources with balancing the interests of all the people in a society is one of the prerequisites for achieving the objectives of the establishment of the EAC. If the resources are not properly managed, there are possibilities for conflicts to occur thereby posing obstacles to achieving the objective of the EAC's establishment.

It is in this understanding that the Treaty provides under articles 111 and 114 for joint management and utilisation of natural resources within the Community for the mutual benefit of the Partner states. The Partner states are, therefore, to take necessary measures to conserve their natural resources; cooperate in the management of their natural resources for the conservation of the ecosystems and the arrest of environmental degradation, and adopt common regulations for the protection of shared aquatic and terrestrial resources.[71] In connection therewith, some protocols require the partner states to cooperate in the environment and natural resources management.

In 2003 the Partner states signed the *Protocol for the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin*.[72] This was in recognition of, among other things, the fact that Lake Victoria is a major source of livelihood for the communities living on the riparian land around the Lake.[73] The communities heavily depend on it for water, fishing, agriculture, transport and tourism, energy production, and trade.[74] All these are the main economic activities in the basin area, which is shared between the states of Tanzania (44%), Kenya (22%), Uganda

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[71] Art.114(1)(a)-(c) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999 as amended on 14th December, 2006 and 20th August, 2007.

[72] According to Art.1 of the Protocol, "Lake Victoria Basin" means that geographical areas extending within the territories of the Partner states determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters flowing into Lake Victoria.

[73] Yara, S.A.(2019), A *Review of the Efficacy of the Legal Framework for Water Hyacinth Management in Kenya's Winam Gulf*, Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Award of Master of Arts Degree in Environmental Law, University of Nairobi, p. iv.

[74] *Ibid*.

(16%), Burundi (7%), and Rwanda (11%) hence, making it one of Africa's largest trans – boundary water resources. The lake itself is shared between Kenya (6%), Tanzania (51%), and Uganda (43%).[75] Lake Victoria, which is Africa's largest and the world's second-largest freshwater lake with a surface area of about 68,800 km², is one of the most important shared natural resources by the partner states in the EAC region.[76]

The lake is endowed with abundant water and other natural resources. The inhabitants of the Lake Victoria Basin – one of the world's most populated rural areas – mainly engage in agriculture. Its water resources support limited irrigation activity, while fishing is a key economic activity for inhabitants along its shores. The lake is a major source of water for neighbouring towns; it has tourism sites; serves as a reservoir for hydropower, and supports water transport. Thus, the Lake is vital to its basin communities and countries.[77]

However, over the years the Lake has been experiencing high levels of pollution resulting in its degradation. Thus, partner states saw the need to take action. Under the Protocol, the partner states have agreed to cooperate in the areas as they relate to the conservation and sustainable utilisation of the resources of the Lake Victoria Basin including sustainable development, management and equitable utilisation of water and fisheries resources; promotion of sustainable agricultural and land use practices; promotion of trade, commerce and industrial development; promotion and development and management of wetlands; promotion and development of infrastructure and energy; maintenance of navigational safety and maritime security; promotion

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[75] Munisi, K. (2017). *The Ramification of Devolution of Environmental Governance in the Lake Victoria Basin: Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in a Comparative Perspective*, Paper Presented at the 7th European Conference on African Studies in Basel, Switzerland, from 29 June to 1 July 2017, p.1.

[76] *Ibid.*

[77] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2016). *Enhancing Water Resources Management through Inclusive Green Economy: The Case of Lake Victoria Basin*, Economic Commission for Africa, ECA Publishing and Distribution Unit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June, p.1.

of public participation in planning and decision making; environmental protection and management of the Basin; promotion of research, capacity building and information exchange; promotion of wildlife conservation and sustainable tourism development, and the like.[78] To realise all these, the Protocol provides the legal and institutional framework which is designed for development intervention across the Basin. The Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management, 2006 is another EAC legal instrument signed by Partner states to, among other things, address resource based conflicts.

The partner states commit themselves to ensuring sound environment and natural resources management in the community and to cooperate among themselves in realising this obligation.[79] They are, therefore, obliged to, *inter alia*, seek to harmonise the policies, laws, and strategies in their national jurisdictions.[80] Apart from addressing the issue of resource based conflicts, the protocol also touches on climate change as a security challenge. The protocol commits the partner states to take deliberate measures aiming at managing the effects of climate change. In this endeavour, they must develop and adopt an integrated approach to address the effects of climate change in the community.[81]

The community must develop and harmonise policies and strategies for enhancing adaptive capacity, building and strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change; develop and harmonise their policies and strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the manner and procedures for benefiting from the Paris Agreement and other similar climate change mitigation activities and strategies; promote the development and implementation of education, training, and public awareness

[78] Art. 3 of the Protocol for the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, 2003. The Protocol was signed by Partner states on 29th November 2003.
[79] Art.6 of the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management, 2006
[80] *Ibid*.
[81] Art.24(1), *ibid*.

programs, including strengthening of national human and institutional capacities on climate change; develop strategies to enhance climate finance by existing obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement; and develop strategies for the transfer, acquisition, and deployment of relevant technologies to alleviate the pressure on fragile ecosystems and natural resources and contribute to sustainable development.[82] Of particular importance is the management of water resources, which are a source of many conflicts in the region. The Protocol provides that the partner states are to develop, harmonise and adopt common national policies, laws, and programs relating to the management and sustainable use of water resources and utilise water resources, including shared water resources, equitably and rationally.[83]

In addressing criminality as one of the security challenges in the region, partner states came up with protocols to that effect. One of them is the Protocol on Combating Drug Trafficking in the East African Region.[84] The main objectives of the protocol are to reduce and eventually eliminate illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, related corruption, and the illicit use and abuse of drugs through cooperation among enforcement agencies and demand reduction through coordinated programs in the region; to eliminate the production of illicit drugs, and to protect the region from being used as a conduit for drugs destined for the international market.[85]

To achieve these objectives, partner states are obliged to promulgate and adopt domestic legislation which satisfies provisions of international conventions on combating illicit drug trafficking and abuse.[86] There is also need for states to cooperate and afford mutual assistance to provide evidence and assistance in the investigation and

[82] Art.24(2), *ibid*.
[83] Art.13(1) and (2), *ibid*.
[84] The Protocol was signed in Arusha on 13th January 2001.
[85] Art. 2 of the Protocol on Combating Drug Trafficking in the East African Region.
[86] Art.3 and 4, *ibid*.

prosecution of illicit drug traffickers.[87] In connection therewith, partner states are to establish appropriate mechanisms for cooperation among their enforcement agencies to promote effective enforcement.[88]

In 2013 partner states also concluded *Protocol on Peace and Security* to cooperate in promoting peace, security, and stability within the Community and good neighbourliness among themselves.[89] According to the Protocol, the Partner states should undertake to protect the people and safeguard the development of the Community against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra and interstate conflicts, and aggression; and co-ordinate and co-operate in matters related to peace and security in the region.[90]

Under the Protocol, areas of cooperation include conflict prevention, management, and resolution; prevention of genocide; combating terrorism; combating and suppressing piracy; peace support operations; disaster risk reduction, management, and crisis response; management of refugees; control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons; combating transnational and cross border crimes; including drug and human trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering, cybercrime, and motor vehicle theft; addressing and combating cattle rustling and Prisons and Correctional Services including exchange of prisoners, detention, custody, and rehabilitation of offenders.[91]

In case of combating transnational and cross-border crimes, the protocol obliges the partner states to undertake joint operations that are aimed at controlling and preventing such crimes including the theft of motor vehicles; the smuggling of goods; illicit drug trafficking; human trafficking; illegal migration; trade in counterfeit

[87] Art.5 and 4, *ibid*.
[88] Art.6(1), *ibid*.
[89] See Art.3 (1) of the Protocol on Peace and Security. The Protocol was signed in Dar es Salaam on 15th February 2013.
[90] Art.3(2), *ibid*.
[91] Art.2 (3), *ibid*.

goods; intellectual property piracy; and the like.[92] Controlling and preventing such crimes shall be effective if the Partner states develop appropriate mechanisms, policies, measures, strategies, and programs, including the establishment of regional databases on cross border crimes; the enhancement of technical capacity for criminal intelligence; the enhancement of the exchange of criminal intelligence and other security information between the partner states central criminal intelligence information centres; the strengthening of cross border security; the training of personnel and sharing information on the *modus operandi* being used by criminals; the enactment of laws on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters; and the establishment of cross border and interstate communication.[93]All these should go hand in hand with the partner states fostering cooperation with regional and international organisations whose activities have a bearing on the objectives of this protocol.[94]

Given the above discussion, it may be argued that efforts were done by the partner states to put in place the EAC legal framework *vis a vis* addressing security challenges in the region. However, the uphill task ahead is that of implementing what is provided in the framework. Much needs to be done to spearhead the implementation of the legal regime; the results of which should be reflected by the extent to which the security challenges are effectively addressed. Otherwise, national legal landscapes alone are not enough to deal with security challenges; most of which are trans boundary.

6. Conclusion

Based on what has been revealed by findings and discussion, the following conclusions are made. The EAC region is facing security challenges, which are real and imminent. It is worth emphasizing that the importance of security as one of the prerequisites for attaining a political federation in the region cannot be underestimated. As such,

[92] Art.12(1), *ibid*.
[93] Art.12(2), *ibid*.
[94] Art.16, *ibid*.

any element of insecurity in the region affects efforts toward realising that goal. Indeed, the EAC region has so far attempted to make efforts to address the security challenges. However, given the dynamic nature of those challenges, the efforts seem to be inadequate.

7. Recommendations

Having identified those security challenges, which are found in the EAC region, the task ahead is to suggest ways of addressing them. Partner states are required to adopt or enhance collective approaches in addressing security issues in the region. The reason behind this is that days of working in isolation have long gone. As such, combined efforts in dealing with security threats, bringing on board all stakeholders, and strengthening public private partnership should be adopted as matters of urgency. To make these suggested ways of approaching security challenges implementable, the following recommendations are made:

First, it has been noted with concern that, unlike other regional economic communities, the EAC does not have a specific (nor central) organ dedicated to peace and security.[95] Instead, several committees and working groups regulate the EAC interstate response to threats to peace and security.[96] It is recommended that the EAC region forms a specific organ dedicated to security. This study recommends that the EAC should engage in joint efforts to develop assets for fishing, aquaculture, coastal development, marine mining, oil, and gas, as well as tourism.[97] The efforts will lead to regional development; thereby reducing suspicion and potential for conflict over competition for resources.

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[95] Svicevic, M (Ed.) (2021). *Compendium of Documents Relating to Regional and Sub-regional Peace and Security in Africa, op cit.*, p. 498.

[96] *Ibid*.

[97] Birech, R.T. (2020). "Africa's Maritime Domain: The Untapped Potential," *The Defender Magazine*, Senior *Command and Staff College*, 2nd Ed., Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria, pp.54-55, p.55.

In addition, much as transnational organised crime is now emerging as a serious threat to national and international security and stability, the EAC region should enhance and strengthen its security initiatives so that it continues to be a safer place to live in. The initiatives should be preceded by identifying all soft targets in the region and ensuring that those targets are sealed off.

Moreover, the importance of the EAC legal regime in the region cannot be overstated in the process toward an effective and meaningful regional economic bloc. Partner states should come up with mechanisms that will ensure maximum implementation of the legal regime and institutional framework in place to address security challenges in the region.

By seizing opportunities in terms of regional cooperation, partner states should forge and encourage the establishment of multijurisdictional taskforces within East Africa to combine intelligence and investigative resources from several law enforcement agencies. The task forces should also carry out periodical intelligence – led joint anticrime operations. Partner states should be at the forefront to implement regional and international security strategies. One such strategy is the *EAC Strategy for Regional Peace and Security*, which addresses several security challenges affecting the East African region. Kiraso (2006), former Deputy Secretary General (Political Federation) of the EAC, underscored the importance of the strategy:

> The advancement in technology, knowledge dispersal and globalization in all aspects continue to influence crime types and trends. To address itself to these changes, the Strategy remains a guiding framework and at the same time, it is inclined to any adjustments to accommodate new emerging security challenges.[98]

[98] East African Community (2006). *Strategy for Regional Peace and Security in East Africa*, the Foreword, pp. 2-3, p. 3. The strategy was adopted by the 13th Council of Ministers meeting, held in November 2006 to guide EAC level interventions in the Peace and Security Sector.

Finally, the advancement in aspects of information, communications, technology, and globalisation, which makes the world a global village, inevitably calls for the partner states to collectively and proactively address all the security challenges urgently. Otherwise, the region shall be full of imminent security threats, whose impacts negatively affect the wellbeing of the people of the region.

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Challenges of United Nations Military Observers in the Contemporary Peacekeeping Operation Environment in Africa

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Abstract

United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) are now targeted by Armed Groups (AGs) due to the change of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) practice from a traditional one to the modern one which involves the use of force. The use of force has caused AGs to be violent and start attacking all peacekeepers as a reprisal. This article uses the theory of collective security to analyses the challenges of UNMOs operations in the contemporary PKOs environment in Africa. The study used both primary and secondary data qualitatively. The sample of the study was selected by a purposive sampling technique and in-depth interview and documentary review methods have been used to collect data. The article concludes that UNMOs are ineffective under the contemporary PKOs settings and therefore military contingents are to do the tasks of UNMOs.

Keywords: *armed groups, collective security, robust peacekeeping operations, United Nations military observers.*

1.0. Introduction

The United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), also known as Military Observers (MILOBs), are unarmed forces deployed to monitor, supervise and report any violation of a ceasefire agreement signed (UN, 2017). The deployment of this force was the best option when Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were invented (Blanco, 2019). This was because, the traditional PKOs, which can be defined as the UN forces deployed to safeguard global peace and security operating without enforcement powers, were based on the three main principles of consent, impartiality, and use of minimum forces except for self – defence (Doyle, and Sambanis, 2007). This means that the UN was always deploying forces that were not intended to wage war with either side of the conflict.

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It is with this fact that the first two UN PKOs, the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) of 1948 for the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) of 1949 were just UNMOs missions (Lyons, 1998). UNMOs were deployed after signing the ceasefire agreement and they were free to meet and interact with all parties in the conflict without any fear of being attacked by any party to the conflict including non – state Armed Groups (AGs). Non-state AGs are dissident armed forces who fight national armed forces or fight each other within a given state or several states (Geneva Convention, 1949). The protection of UNMOs had been drawn from those PKOs principles which gave confidence to AGs. UNMOs are a non – threatening force; as such AGs have not been harming UNMOs, and instead, they have been interacting with them on different peace initiatives. The UN flag, UN marks, and blue helmet/beret are distinguishing marks that show that they are a peaceful force.

However, when the threats to Peacekeepers increased, the UN deliberately decided to change its operation concept and came up with a relatively powerful force for the self – protection of peacekeepers. The deployment of the UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF - 1) during the Suez Crisis in 1956 to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed between Egypt and Israel was the first time in PKOs that the troops carried weapons (UN, 1956). But the security situation on the ground continued exponentially to be worse. Because of that, the necessity for Peacekeepers to use force was increasing.

The deployment of "*Opération des Nations Unies ou Congo*" (ONUC) on 20th July 1960 which waged war with AGs changed the dynamic from non – use of force to fully using force (UN, 1960). In contrast with the traditional PKOs, which emphasised impartial and unarmed peacekeepers, the new environment required peacekeepers to use force and to be aggressive (Gibbs, 2000). The situation went like that and reached a climax in 2013 after the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in DRC which was mandated to carry out targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile, and versatile manner to neutralise and disarm AGs in DRC (UN, 2013). It

was for the first time the UN – mandated peacekeepers to have artillery, Special Forces, drones, some Airpower, and others. Almost all missions nowadays are issued with a robust mandate.

Carsten, Iverson, and Silva (2020) define robust peacekeeping as those Peacekeeping missions in which peacekeepers are authorised to employ armed *force* beyond the traditional exception of self – defence. Regardless of this change in the PKOs environment, the UN still deploys UNMOs working in conjunction with other components of PKOs which have been mandated to use force.

As a result of these changes, AGs have become more violent to peacekeepers including UNMOs as a reprisal. They attack even UNMOs because they fail to distinguish between UNMOs and other PKOs components. This has posed a big security challenge to UNMOs because they are not armed, as such they become a soft target to AGs. The fatality rate of peacekeepers including UNMOs is on the increase since the UN adopted the aggressive and robust concept. For example, about 196 Peacekeepers including UNMOs were killed by acts of violence from 2013 – 2017 (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano 2017).

It is from this background that this study was undertaken to analyse the challenges facing UNMOs in carrying out their obligations under the current peacekeeping environment and possible alternatives for replacing their tasks. The study concludes that UNMOs are ineffective under the contemporary PKOs settings as such it has been recommended that, military contingents do the tasks of UNMOs.

There have been different studies done on the evolution of PKOs by different scholars such as Goulding (1993); Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017); Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova, (2016), but all those studies did not cover the relations between evolutions of PKOs and the functionality of the UNMOs. Therefore, this study is expected to add knowledge to the area of peacekeeping with a focus on the challenges of UNMOs operations in the contemporary PKOs environment, especially in Africa.

1.1. The United Nations Military Observers

As stated above, the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) are unarmed forces deployed to monitor, supervise and report any violation of the ceasefire agreement signed (UN, 2017). They form part of the military component of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in line with collective security. The military component in the UN peacekeeping mission always comprises military contingents (troops), staff officers (MSOs), and UNMOs (UN, 2002). It is common, especially in interstate conflicts that the states involved in conflict fail to trust each other after the ceasefire agreement. After signing consents, the UN always establishes a neutral zone between them where it deploys unarmed, impartial, and credible observers to monitor and report violations of any ceasefire agreement reached. This force is the UNMOs and their operations end after genuine peace has been achieved, in most cases after signing a peace treaty. The force has no authority or power to stop either side from violating the ceasefire agreement; instead, they have been reporting those violations to the Security Council (SC) (Baker, 1994). *The sole duty of the UNMOs is reporting*, said one MILOB in Darfur during an interview.

According to UN Military Observers in Peacekeeping (UN, 2017), each mission has specific tasks for UNMOs, but the common ones are observation, monitoring, and reporting which are the core role of UNMOs where they observe and timely report on general or specific issues concerning the implementation of ceasefire agreement or any violation observed. They monitor the ceasefire, withdrawals, and demilitarisation agreements; supervise destructions of weapons and ammunitions; patrol; undertake different investigations; and others. UNMOs may be employed to assess or verify reports related to AGs, different violations such as violations against ceasefire or human rights.

They may be tasked to coordinate negotiations and mediations formally or informally between different groups in conflict. They may also be tasked to coordinate and liaise between the mission and other actors in resolving conflict. In fulfilling these tasks, the UNMOs conduct foot, vehicle, air, and waterborne patrols (Mandel, et al.,

2010). To achieve neutrality in reporting, UNMOs are always grouped into teams of 6 observers made of officers from different countries with at least two female officers (UN, 2017). They are deployed in remote areas for one year and are internally rotated frequently. Only military officers are deployed as UNMOs because of the sensitivity of the task.

During the foundation of PKOs as a tool for collective security, especially during the cold war, it was expected that the UN will be deploying UNMOs for such tasks. The traditional PKOs' principles (consent, impartiality, and use of minimum force) which guide the operations of PKOs fit the UNMOs operations and those principles make them acceptable by all parties in the conflict and by the local population. A UNAMID UNMO commented that the UNMOs are real peacekeepers according to the UN Charter. It is with this fact that many PKOs before 1988 were unarmed UNMOs (Yilmaz, 2005). It should be recalled that the first two UN PKOs were observer missions with unarmed troops. The first one was the UNTSO which was a UNMOs mission deployed in 1948 under UNSCR 50 of May 1948 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Arab countries (UN, 1948). The second UNMOs mission was the UNMOGIP deployed in 1949 under UNSCR 47 of 1948 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan. These two missions are in operation to date (UN, 1949).

UNMOs are friendly to all parties in the conflict including AGs. The three principles of PKOs (consent, impartiality, and minimum use of forces) gave trust and confidence to warring parties that UNMOs' intention is not to fight them but to resolve the conflicts. Their status of being unarmed made AGs to consider them as non – threatening force which they could face at any time. The UN flag and blue helmet/beret offer protection to UNMOs, and they are perceived by parties in the conflict, especially by non-state AGs as harmless. Consent is one crucial principle of PKOs that protects UNMOs.

A Peacekeeper in Goma commented that, if consent has been given, it simply means that Peacekeepers deployed are not part of the conflict and so they will be respected and protected. However, consent cannot

always guarantee the safety of UNMOs especially when there is weak command and control or when the parties in the conflict especially non – state AGs are internally divided and they are not under the control of strong leadership. The principle of impartiality also gives protection to UNMOs. Under impartiality, all parties in the conflict are treated equally whereby there is no enemy of UNMOs.

But article 3 of the Convention on the Safety of the UN and Associated personnel (Safety Convention of 1994) protects UNMOs and their facilities against any violence from any party in the conflict (UN, 1994). The UN personnel and facilities are required to have proper documentation and be marked with distinctive UN identifications (UN, 1994). This regulation was aimed at facilitating the protection of UNMOs and other components of the PKOs. Apart from those principles, the host government has a duty and responsibility to protect UNMOs for the whole period of their deployment in line with the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) policy (UN, 2011). The UN will only supplement the efforts of the host nations if it feels that there is need to do so. The protection includes evacuation in case of danger. We can conclude that the traditional PKOs still conform to the traditional PKOs principles in UN military observer missions.

Because of those mechanisms, AGs had been inviting UNMOs to interact with them and air out their demand, and discuss any other issues relevant to the peace process such as Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process. They have been more active and effective during the cold war when interstate conflicts were dominating. However, their big operational challenge is their security because they are deployed in small numbers in a remote area and do not carry weapons; as such they have become a soft target and are vulnerable to attacks, hostage taking, or even harassment from AGs or any other party to a conflict. The major condition for them to work effectively is the assurance of the condition of security (UN, 2017).

2.0. Materials and Methods

This paper analyses the challenges of UNMOs in contemporary peacekeeping operation settings. Data for preparations of this article were collected between July 2020 and March 2021 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth, referred to as the DRC or Congo) and Darfur, Sudan. The study involved senior and junior UN staff members including military commanders of the MONUSCO and UNAMID, some academicians, and locals.

The researchers used in-depth interviews by targeting key informants and documentary reviews to compile the needed data. The study employed a purposive sampling procedure, by which samples were selected based on their knowledge of PKOs, population characteristics, and the objectives of the study. A total of 20 respondents comprising different sexes, ages, races, knowledge bases, and expertise were involved.

The study employed a qualitative research approach. The validity of the data collection tools was achieved through face validity where the data collection methods were crafted before application to detect whether or not they would measure what was intended to be measured. Data reliability was achieved by pre – testing the data collection methods on a small sample of respondents in Darfur, Sudan through expected respondents from those who have been involved in peace – keeping missions, armed forces, and similar engagements before full swing data collection.

3.0. Theoretical Consideration

This study is guided by collective security theory. The theory is based on the idea that each member state accepts that, the security of one state is a concern of all states and agrees to join in collective measures against the aggressor (Fitzmaurice, 1989). Collective security is machinery for collective actions to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order (Ebegbulem, 2011). The League of Nations and the United Nations (UN) are examples of collective security mechanisms for the prevention of war. It is through this principle that the UN has the power to discourage any member state from acts that would threaten peace and security.

Collective security theory has not escaped criticism from different scholars. For example, Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton (1985) argued that, the theory is perfect, but it is idealistic because it works under some assumptions which have been criticised. For example, it assumes that there will be a common understanding between all member states on which state is the aggressor and that, all states will be committed to dealing with the aggressor, which practically is not a reality. The fact is that states tend to be power – seeking and this behaviour is rooted in the biological drives of a human being.

The theory also admits that war (though the use of PKOs) is a means to resolve conflicts that are contrary to its principles of prevention of war. In a similar tone, Claude (1992) argues that the theory can transform the local war into a global war by involving all nations in a particular conflict, and also it always has bureaucracy in taking decisions. Dinesh (2021) points out that, the theory has given rights to states to wage war as a measure of self – defence which undermines its objective.

4.0. Results and Discussion

Due to the nature of security challenges during the foundation of PKOs, it was envisaged that the use of force would be very minimum. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force whereby member states are advised to refrain from using force or threats against the territorial integrity or independence of any member (UN, 2021). However, it gave rights to the use of force for self – defence and in maintaining International Peace and Security under given conditions as stated in Article 51 of the Charter (UN, 2020).

> *The UN was formed as a result among other many factors, of the bloody atrocities committed during World War Two (WWII), fought from 1939 to 1945. Thus, the use of force by the UN was perceived as going back to what the UN did not want to happen again,*

This was said by a member of a diplomatic core in Dar es Salaam during an Interview. Therefore, PKOs using UNMOs as a collective security tool were believed to be more peaceful than the use of force under those conditions. But even resolving conflicts at that time was

easy based on the type of conflicts and type of actors; their interests and their demands were easy to be addressed.

But the experience from the two UNMOs missions showed that there were some threats to UNMOs from conflicting parties that require peace keepers to carry light weapons for their self – defence. The deployment of the UNEF - 1 during the Suez Crisis in 1956 to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed between Egypt and Israel was the first time in PKOs for the troops to carry weapons (UN, 1956). But threats to Peacekeepers were increasing and the use of force by peacekeepers was unavoidable. The deployment of ONUC on 20th July 1960 saw increased use of force beyond self – defence. ONUC sometimes was forced to fight conventionally.

The use of force was extended to the protection of civilians (POC) which can be defined as all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual following the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (Willmot, Mamiya, Sheeran, & Weller, 2016). POC was given more emphasis following the UN failures in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia where there were mass killings and atrocities on innocent civilians (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2017). The biggest failure of PKOs was the United Nations Assistance Missions for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda. The sources of the failure were many, but the mainly weak mandate given by the UN Security Council Resolution 872 of 1993 made the SC not to deploy sufficient Peacekeepers in Rwanda and with limited weapons and equipment to deter genocide (Totten, & Bartrop, 2004). The failure of PKOs in other missions such as in Somalia and Bosnia was mainly attributed to a weak mandate. The failures were a direct indication of the limited capability of the UN forces to mitigate violence and protect against human rights violations using the traditional PKOs concept as a collective security tool. But the failures were also in line with the criticism of collective security whereby, the UN always has bureaucracy in taking a decision and is always reluctant to use force (Dinesh, 2021). Following the report of those failures, the UN adopted UNSCR 1265 of 1999 mandating Peacekeepers to use even deadly force to protect civilians under

imminent threats (UN, 1999). The UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first mission with an emphasis on POC (UN, 1999). Then in 1992, the "1992 Agenda for peace document" initiated the enforcement operations in intra – state conflicts mostly without being given consent (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

The UN's 1995 Supplement to 'Agenda for Peace' acknowledged that the shifting from interstate to intrastate conflicts after the cold war exposed civilians to be victims and they have been the major target in the conflicts (UN, 1995). The emergence of terrorism and other transnational criminality in the 2000s which are connected to AGs made the situation worse (Solà-Martín, & Woodhouse, 2011). Peacekeepers in the contemporary security environment face AGs, Terrorists, Organised crime, street gangs, criminals, drug dealers, political exploitation, and many other threats.

For example, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has turned its political objectives of wanting to overthrow the government of Uganda into a terrorist group connected to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Cengiz, & Cinoglu, 2022). Other terrorist groups which pose security threats are Al-Shabaab in Somalia, BOKO Haram in Nigeria and surrounding states, and Ansar Sunna Wall Jamaa in Mozambique. Their tactics include attacking using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide which causes massive damage. For example, in 2015, Al-Shabaab killed about 148 people at Garissa University College in Kenya (Cannon & Ruto, 2019). The UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) report showed that more than 1,300 people were killed by AGs in the DRC from January to June 2020, three times more than in the same period in 2019 (UN, 2020). The shooting down of a UN helicopter by M23 rebel group, killing 8 peacekeepers on 29 March 2022 in Eastern DRC is a testimony that AGs have more capability than ever before (African News, 2022). There is an increase in the number of Peacekeepers killed in this period compared to some years back. For example, about 196 Peacekeepers have been killed by acts of violence from 2013 – 2017 (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017).

It is a fact that this situation necessitates PKOs to be more robust, and flexible with strength and military capacity to operate in a wide range of operations and situations. Contrary to the traditional peacekeeping principles which emphasize neutral and lighter armed peacekeepers, the UN now has been deploying PKOs in civil conflict zones even before the cease – fire agreements, as such, their operations are beyond monitoring of cease-fire agreement. The environment requires PKOs to use chapter VII of the UN Charter, with a much stronger and more robust mandate to use more sophisticated weapons to be able to conduct a wider range of operations. In that regard, the UN was forced by the situation to migrate from traditional peacekeeping (UNMOs) to the use of force which fits with security challenges occurring in the field.

As such, the UN started slowly giving Peacekeepers robust mandates and the authority to use force beyond self – defence. Since that time, almost 95% of all UN PKOs deployed have been mandated to protect civilians using all available means even using force (Weller, Solomou, & Rylatt, 2015). As of now, the UN is issuing a more robust mandate with equivalent resources (weapons, equipment, and technologies). To achieve the required objective contemporary PKOs carry out military operations in a robust posture, collect intelligence, carry out preventive measures such as patrols, and protect civilians at all costs, even by using force. For example, the FIB in DRC had been mandated to use drones, Artillery, Attack Helicopters, Special Forces, and others which are contrary to the traditional PKOs principle of use of minimum force. It is a fact that no AGs will be ready to face a strong UN force, meaning that weak peacekeepers are vulnerable to being attacked by AGs. In all these changes, the UN is still deploying UNMOs who are undertaking their obligations alongside other forces with robust mandates.

Different studies done on the effectiveness of PKOs have been suggesting PKOs be robust and not refrain from using force. The Brahimi report of 2000 introduced the concept of robust peacekeeping which require PKOs to be aggressive in executing their duties. Though with a condition, the report recommended the use of force at the tactical level with authorization of the SC in defending

mandate (Brahimi, 2000). On the same, the Cruz report of 2018 also recommended the UN change its mind set from using chapter VI to a more robust posture and not fear to use force where necessary (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017). Other Scholars such as Von Hippel (2000), O'Hanlon, (2003), and Dobbins, (2003) support the idea of robust use of force (peace enforcement) and argue that any actor (UN or non – UN actor) may undertake an enforcement mission.

Huntington in his study on the Clash of Civilisation asserted that, because of the Clash of Civilisation, there will be an increase in terrorist attacks against states whose governments support the government of the terrorist home country (Huntington, 2000). He also predicted that there will be excessive terror attacks on Western targets because of its strategic value. This means that the capacity and capability of terrorists will be increasing as such the use of force in the future will be on increase.

The achievement of FIB in DRC to defeat the M23 rebel group in 2013 is testimony that the use of force is necessary for contemporary security threats. The robust mandate (Chapter VII of the UN Mandate) played a great role in availing FIB troops the freedom of operations. Firepower possessed by FIB such as Artillery, Air power, and drones also contributed much to the effectiveness of the FIB. Up to now, PKOs with a robust mandate are doing better in the field than those which use traditional peacekeeping principles. In DRC, for example, the UN depends more on FIB during any threat than the rest of the forces (Framework Brigades) which still use traditional peacekeeping principles (Karlsrud, 2015).

However, the role of peacekeepers is becoming complicated and dangerous because Peacekeepers are deployed to fight and not monitor. Their safety is not guaranteed by any principle as the AGs are directly targeting them. The UN badges (Blue beret/helmet), UN flags, and insignia are no longer offering protection to peacekeepers (UN, 1990). UNMOs who are unarmed, are the ones who have been affected more by this new approach which has reduced their effectiveness. As we have seen above, UNMOs are unarmed and work freely with all parties in the conflicting areas, especially non –

state AGs and civilians. Because of the offensive nature of the PKOs adopted, the AGs are targeting UNMOs as a reprisal. This is because they all have similar distinctive UN identifications (insignia and the UN colours). AGs cannot distinguish between other peacekeepers with a robust mandate and other UN staff like UNMOs (Muller, 2015). UNMOs now have been perceived by AGs not to be impartial because they are taking the side with mandate to attack them. The consequences of this have been seen on the ground whereby UNMOs have been killed by AGs in different situations because they cannot protect themselves and also, they are always moving out and becoming a soft target. Their convoy is always vulnerable to AGs attacks as records show that about 50% of all fatalities in PKOs are sustained during vehicle movements (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017).

The fatality of peacekeepers (both UNMOs and others) has been increasing because of the new posture of PKOs. For example, in 2017 alone, more than 56 peacekeepers were killed, which is the highest number since 1994 (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017). Under these contemporary PKOs conditions, one may ask, how can the UNMOs do their operations effectively? What will be their safety? What will be the substitute for UNMOs? For example, due to these challenges, it was even proposed for FIB in DRC to be separated from the rest of MONUSCO forces (framework brigades) and to refrain from putting on UN badges (Blue beret/helmet) and insignia so that they can be distinguished from other neutral UN forces. But it was argued that, even if they were separated from MONUSCO, FIB would affect the general peace process as rebels will fear coming to a negotiating table thinking that perhaps UN forces would hunt them down as what FIB has once done (Spijkers, 2015).

There was the recommendation that UNMOs need to be carrying weapons for their protection, especially when operating in an insecure environment. But it was argued that letting UNMOs carry weapons might increase their risks instead of reducing them as this would give the impression that they were part of the conflict (Cammaert, & Blyth, 2013). One academician in Dar es Salaam during interview

commented that it also would negatively affect the capability of UNMOs to interact with AGs and the local population which is part of the conflict. Furthermore, carrying weapons will make UNMOs lose their peculiar status of protection under the Safety Convention by being considered to be part of combatants. A member of diplomatic corps in Dar es Salaam said the following during an interview:

> *The AGs and other parties to the conflict will question the UNMOs' impartiality as an "unarmed neutral force" as such confidence-building efforts will be doubtful, resulting in complications in monitoring and observing the peace process in the conflicting areas,*

Similarly arming UNMOs may even endanger local populations and hence affect the collateral damage. But in very exceptional circumstances such as the presence of terrorists and any violent AGs, UNMOs may be allowed to carry weapons for their protection after recommendation and approval from their respective authorities (UN, 2017).

We have seen that the UN is still deploying UNMOs working alongside other PKOs components. Also, the use of force makes the AGs violent and attack peacekeepers especially soft targets like UNMOs. In that case, the challenge is how to protect those soft targets. Resolving this puzzle, the UN has been protecting them using other PKOs when they are operating in a violent environment. The question is, how are UNMOs going to be protected or armed and at the same time retain the same status of being harmless to AGs that they had before? The simple answer is that you cannot protect UNMOs using other PKOs components or arming them and be effective because the AGs will not be free to meet them. The confidence of AGs is built from the fact that UNMOs are unarmed. Instead of interacting, the AGs will be attacking UNMOs after failing to distinguish between UNMOs and forces aimed at neutralising them. Equally, the AGs will be attacking UNMOs as revenge because of the offensive actions of other components of the UN. On the same line, we have seen that, one of the important environments which enable UNMOs to effectively work is a peaceful condition, but the reality is that the contemporary security situation is violent. How are

UNMOs going to be effective in this environment? Therefore, it is a fact that, under the current peacekeeping environment, the UNMOs are ineffective. It is difficult for UNMOs to be effective under the current situation where almost 90% of all PKOs mandate is the protection of civilians using all means, including using deadly force. During an interview, one academician in Goma asked the following question during an interview.

> *How will UNMOs operate in such conditions, knowing that they are the eyes and ears of Mission?*

The other question is what will be the substitute for the UNMOs if they are not fitting in the current PKOs environment? The current PKOs environment which involves bandits, terrorists, drug dealers, and others does not require UNMOs to sit down with them and negotiate peace. As we have seen, their demands and interests are beyond the capability of a state to fulfil. Therefore, in the case of the collection of information, the UN needs to train contingents who are armed to collect information, especially from the population.

By the way, they have been collecting information during their patrols whereby they have been meeting populations as well as AGs and talking to them. One of the tasks of patrol, whenever it goes out, is to collect information, what is that special information which contingents cannot collect? What is needed is training. By the way, if the situation is so tense, UNMOs never go out, instead, it is the force that goes out to collect information. As one academician argued in Dar es Salaam:

> *It is a duplication of tasks to employ UNMOs who are escorted by the force to do the task which contingents can do.*

5.0. Conclusion

During the crafting of the UN charter, the security challenges we are facing today were not predicted, as such UNMOs were expected to be effective in addressing global conflicts using PKOs as a collective security tool. But the UN has been forced by the current security situation to adopt the use of force and migrate from its traditional PKOs where UNMOs were desirable and effective. However, with the recent security dynamics, the deployment of robust forces is the

solution to the challenges of contemporary PKOs. The biggest challenge now is how to strike a balance between using force by one component of PKOs and the risks of AGs' attacks on other components of the UN PKOs who by nature of their activities, are not supposed to carry weapons such as UNMOs. In this regard, under the contemporary PKOs environment, the UNMOs are ineffective. Since the collection of information and monitoring of the situation is still required by the UN, then the UN needs to strengthen the capability of the force itself to substitute the UNMOs. These forces have been doing almost all UNMOs' activities, especially during the worse security threats where UNMOs have failed to go out.

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The Role of Foreign Aid in the Dissemination of Civic and Voter Education during 1995 – 2020 General Elections in Tanzania

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Abstract

This article examines the extent to which foreign aid played a role in shaping the electoral practices related to the dissemination of civic and voter education in the past six multiparty general elections conducted in Tanzania from 1995 to 2020. The study employed a qualitative research approach and used primary data through key informant interviews. Secondary data were obtained from a documentary review. The findings reveal that in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 foreign donors had a significant influence on determining the content of civic and voter education materials used to conduct the exercise. In the 2015 elections, donors' funds were reduced significantly and in the 2020 election, the budget was fully government-funded. The study recommends that the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) should establish elections consolidated funds that will be funded by the government yearly to ensure the availability of sufficient funds to conduct the exercise and ultimately limit the intervention of foreign donors in the dissemination of civic and voter education.

Keywords: *CSOs, electoral processes, EMBs, foreign aid, voter education*

1.0. Introduction

The 1980s and 1990s were a period of economic and political reform (Bird, 1996; Dijkstra, 2002). During this period, donors started to tie their aid policies with political conditions related to elections, good governance, and human rights (Stokke, 1995; Crawford, 1997). These conditions became the most important aid policy instrument used by donors to push for political reforms and were described as the most salient characteristic feature of foreign aid (Carlsson et

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al, 1997; Selbervik, 1999; Mukandala, 1999). The relationship between foreign aid and dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania elections seems not to be an issue adequately covered in many debates and studies.

The first elections in 1962 were held under a multiparty system and when the country adopted a single – party system, elections were held after every five years, (i.e. 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990). Zanzibar, as well, has had a long history of multiparty elections which are recorded before the year 1992. These include the 1957 July multiparty elections, 17 January 1961 elections, 1st June 1961 elections, and 1963 elections (Ndumbaro, 1997; Mmuya, 1998).

All these elections were funded from within and there was either little or no civic and voter education provision. Most of the materials for these elections, and the campaigns for the entire electoral process, were funded by the state. The single party phenomenon ensured that the party has its structures firmly rooted in the grassroots ten – cell leader's system to the national level (Ndumbaro and Yahya – Othman, 2007). Although multiparty elections were conducted before 1992 in Tanzania, the then political playfield was skewed and unable to guarantee the freeness and fairness for disseminating civic and voter education. From 1965 to 1985 the single – party government excluded civil society from participating in political activities (Cliffe, 1967; Malya, 2006).

Donors started disbursing foreign aid to elections in the country immediately after the restoration of the multiparty political system in 1992. This development was due to government's inadequate resources to finance the whole electoral process. It was also because the government's quest to acquire international legitimacy of the electoral process and certification of elections results. Another reason was that there was a multiplicity of electoral process actors such as NGOs and opposition parties which depend on foreign support to disseminate civic and voter's education. Since 1992, Tanzania has conducted six general elections, which are as follows 1995, 2000,

2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. Carothers (1999) argues that foreign aid has never been non – political, neutral, or simply a technical exercise of providing resources to improve development.

In this sense, many aspects of foreign aid hold political implications that require consideration, including how it is disbursed, the areas prioritized, who gets funded, how the funds are utilized by the recipients, and the outcome of such interventions (Nyagetera, 1995; Bagachwa et al, 1997; Wangwe, 1997). Since the 1990s, there has been a significant donors' presence in the electoral politics in Tanzania. Foreign funds have been part and parcel of financing various aspects and stages of the electoral process. While many studies on the role and influence of foreign aid on the development and politics of the Third World countries like Tanzania are available, little knowledge exists concerning the role and influence of foreign aid in the dissemination of civic and voter education. This study is an attempt to bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the relations which exist between foreign aid and the dissemination of civic and voter education in the country.

2.0. Literature Review:

2.1. Foreign Aid for Civic and Voter Education

The provision of civic and voter education is an important aspect that attracts donors' involvement in electoral processes. The main goal of such programs is to expand democratic participation, particularly among marginalized and underrepresented segments of society. Activities include raising awareness of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, such as voting rights, and practical information about where, when, and how to vote. Civic and voter education is often conducted by different types of civil society organizations (international, national, and local level organizations). These organizations require long – term support that spans the entire electoral cycle and, supporting them is expected to produce informed voters and high voter turnout (Reeves, 2006; DFID, 2011).

Donors' involvement in civic and voter's education provision and specifically non – violence training programs can reduce violence happening during the electoral process. This is done by encouraging voters to vote outside of ethnic and religious lines, avoiding vote buying, and supporting non – violent tactics. In this way, civic and voter education can reduce violence by reinforcing voters' understanding of the electoral process through encouraging electoral choices based on candidates' programs, and by fighting against the 'strong man syndrome' and vote – catching. Voter education can help to prevent these types of electoral violence which result from a misunderstanding of the electoral process (Laserud, 2007; Haider, 2008; IFES, 2012).

Electoral assistance in this category is often quite material and technical. For example, international organizations may repair or construct voter lists and teach local authorities how such lists should be assembled and maintained. This can influence who votes in a given country. International actors may also provide ballot boxes, help print and distribute materials, provide computer and communication equipment, and so forth. For instance, The European Commission supervised electoral reform in the Palestinian Authority, but it also financed millions of euros' worth of technical equipment and assistance (EC, 2006). The influence of such logistical assistance is clear and observable. However, in addition to the direct and immediate observable outcomes, logistical assistance may also influence how elections are run in the future (Lopez-Pintor, 1998). Thus, even plain donors' logistical support in civic and voter education provision can influence elections in several ways.

In addition to logistical support, international actors reduce inexperience by training administrative officials and poll workers and educating voters. They may even help to organize debates. Such direct engagement may socialize domestic actors into international electoral norms. Staff training and voter education may teach poll workers, election officials, and voters how to protect the secrecy of the vote. In new multiparty states, such socialization may occur more

readily because beginners tend to be more prone to outside influences (Manning and Malbrough, 2010; Elklit, 2011; Heinrich and Loftis, 2019).

3.0. Methods

The study employed a qualitative approach. The collected data were subjected to content analysis. This approach allows an in – depth understanding of a social phenomenon from 1995 to 2020 (Babbie, 1992). The study used two main methods of data collection, namely key informant interviews (KIIs**)** and semi – structured interviews to collect information through questions and discussions with different informants.

Interviews were conducted in person mainly in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma. A total of 25 key informants from local and foreign institutions were interviewed between January and June 2020. The study collected 13 responses from men and 12 from women. Key informants were purposefully chosen because they were well positioned to produce first – hand information concerning the role of foreign aid in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania. The documentary review involved a review and assessment of various documentary sources containing information related to this study. This included newspapers, peer-reviewed articles, working papers, scholarly books, election Acts, theses, and multi – party elections reports for donors, governments, and other various stakeholders in Tanzania.

4.0. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework informing this study is based on the determinants which influence recipients' compliance with donors' conditionality. There is much literature on compliance and conditionality which explains various reasons that influence recipients' compliance with donors' conditionality. Several scholars share ideas on factors such as the lack of financial capacity on the part of recipient actors wishing to participate in the electoral processes and the weak strategic position of recipient actors to

negotiate with donors in which case the recipients fail to demand better terms of agreements related to foreign aid to be disbursed to recipient actors (Riddell, 2007; Kilby, 2009; Stone, 2011; Hernandez, 2016; Li, 2016; Girod and Tobin, 2016). This section only highlights a few relevant concepts and conclusions to guide the analysis of the role of foreign aid in the dissemination of civic and voter education in the Tanzanian electoral process conducted in the first six multiparty elections from 1995 to 2020.

Freaks (2006:15) provides a useful definition of the concept of conditionality: "Conditionality is the promise of increase of aid in the case of compliance by a recipient with conditions set by a donor, or its withdrawal or reduction in the case of non – compliance". Likewise, Stokke (1005:12) defines conditionality as 'the use of pressure, by the donor government, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient.

Policy conditionality, as insisted by Kaul *et al* (2003), has been one of the means to try to ensure that objectives are met. Donors may impose explicit conditions and requirements about how they believe that aid should be used and then withhold or withdraw aid if these conditions are not met (Rachel et al, 2021). These ideas and concepts fit in explaining the real nature of Tanzania's electoral actors who participate in the dissemination of civic and voters' education. It is only the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) that have the budget though not enough to conduct the exercise and therefore depend on foreign support. Actors such as political parties, NGOs, and CSOs depend entirely on foreign support from donors to do the exercise (Dietrich and Wright, 2013). Therefore, the weak strategic position and lack of income sources for domestic actors significantly affect their role in the process, for them to get foreign support they should comply with donors' conditions.

Several scholars such as Dietrich and Wright (2015; Carothers (2015; Zamfir and Debreva (2019) emphasize that democracy aid has

political conditionality which aims to influence the democratization process in the recipient countries. For the case of Tanzania, this seems to support pro – democracy institutions which actively engage in the dissemination of civic and voter education to the electorate. These include civil society organizations, electoral institutions, political parties, media organizations, and human rights commissions.

5.0. The significance of civic and voter education in Tanzania

The relationship between democratization in Africa and training for everyone from the grassroots level to the highest political ranks and the success of the new multiparty political systems will, to a large extent, depend upon the effective dissemination of civic education and human capacity building. For the western type of democracy to be stable and sustainable in Africa, there is a need for a minimal level of education and political awareness to spread throughout the social spectrum and the majority of the population. This is necessary so that the voting process is understood and electorate participation is high (Maliyamkono, 1994; Hodd, 1994). This wide understanding is what is popularly called "civic education".

According to Shaba (1993), civic education is the process of empowering the civil society with information that gradually transforms the people into an active and vibrant society. It is the information that will enable them to demand the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and people's full participation. She further argues that people will increasingly monitor what goes on in government; they will query government systems, procedures, regulations, and officials who serve them. People should know who does what so that they can demand a replacement be it a member of parliament, minister, president, ward councillor, village chairman, director, or any other official who does not fulfil his or her obligations.

Voter education is just one aspect of civic education that deals with the process of passing knowledge of the electoral process to the electorate. The information disseminated to the citizen includes the

location of the polling station, organization of the polling station, voting procedures, behaviour, secrecy of the vote, and mechanisms to discourage election fraud. Various strategies are employed such as training manuals, theatre group performances, seminars, workshops, and political parties' roles. Schools and tertiary institutions are also important actors in civic and voter education dissemination (Rugalabamu, 1996).

From the same perspective, Wanyande (1997) also narrows civic education to the dissemination of information and knowledge about the importance of casting a vote, especially in councillor, parliamentary and presidential elections. This information in about why people should vote, how to vote, what action to take when one is dissatisfied with the electoral process in general and voting in particular. He further cites the government itself, the media, and political campaigns by politicians, NGOs, trade unions, and the electoral commissions as agents of civic education.

Given the preceding discussion, one may argue that voter education should aim at empowering citizens in general and potential voters in particular, to effectively participate in the electoral process and to make informed and rational choices when choosing leaders and political parties. In Tanzania's context civic and voter education is important as it is the way of introducing and encouraging a new political culture that recognizes the value of participatory politics. It is also important for enabling voters to make informed and rational choices when electing their constituency representatives, presidential candidates, or a political party. The information and knowledge generated through voter education provides voters with information upon which to decide how to vote, and who to vote for, including the party to vote to power and why to vote in that particular manner.

Civic and voter education is also important because, through it, citizens are made to understand and appreciate the value of democracy and the power of the vote. The voting exercise enables the people to control the government and the leaders in power by making

these leaders accountable to the electorate. Through voter education, citizens understand the importance of the voting card, and casting the ballot represents real power that the voter must use to elect government and leaders that are going to be responsive and accountable to the citizens.

Dissemination of civic and voter education is an attempt to sustain the democratic gains that have been made so far in Tanzania since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992. Voter registration is an important exercise that should be carried out continuously by the electoral management bodies as many changes happen in between election cycles such as the passing away of registered voters, new unregistered voters, registration of new political parties, and nullification of existing political parties among other factors. According to Thesing and Hofmeister (1995), the general aim of political education is to create the conditions for the understanding of and active participation in democracy. One task is to encourage interest in politics. What politics is and how it works in a democratic system are questions to be dealt with, as this is the fundamental goal of preserving and reinforcing democracy through political education.

Simply put, civic and voter education is significant and it needs the deliberate cooperation of all stakeholders responsible for making the exercise a success for the electorate in Tanzania. If civic and voter education is not provided effectively and the general public is not informed, the obvious effects are harmful to successful elections as low voter turnout may appear for the electorate who may not see the importance of voting believing that the voting exercise or participating in the electoral process may not bring any changes.

6.0 Actors for Civic and Voter Education Dissemination

There are many actors involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania. The introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 widened the spectrum to enhance participatory democracy and civic competence for the public to make informed decisions in the electoral process. The observation of the past six multiparty elections

in Tanzania from 1995 to 2020 revealed several actors or agents who have been involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education. These actors include EMBs, political parties, NGOs, CSOs, media, politicians, and tertiary education institutions. In an actual sense, every responsible citizen as a member of the community is by design a source of information and opinions regarding political issues which directly and indirectly influence others to make important decisions that will affect the community and country's development in general (Jennings, 1999).

The government system whether central or local governance structures are agents for civic and voter education because the public has much trust in the information provided by the government and that information disseminated by the government is reliable and confirmed. On the other side, the government's success to implement many development projects in the public depends on the politically aware and informed citizenry. The government in Tanzania has been allocating resources dedicated to enhancing the provision of political education to create public and civic awareness of issues related to voter education and the right of the people to participate in elections.

The most important agents for the provision of civic and voter education in Tanzania are the EMBs in particular the National Electoral Committee (NEC) for Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar Electoral Committee (ZEC) for Zanzibar Island which has constitutional rights to manage and administer elections. The EMBs are very crucial in the exercise because they issue regulations, rules, policies, and laws governing the conduct of elections in Tanzania. The EMBs can do the exercise through the use of mass media, seminars, workshops, and public meetings to explain election rules and regulations to the public and potential voters (USAID, 2002).

The mass media is an important agent for civic and voter education in the country. The media has many advantages as it can disseminate information to a larger audience than any other means or channel of communication. The use of radio, television, newspapers, brochures,

posters, and online channels like Whats App, websites, blogs, etc are very effective methods for the dissemination of information and knowledge about electoral activities and voter education in particular. However, those involved in the mass media should not be manipulated to provide wrong information to the public (Simom, 1998; MCT, 2015).

Politicians through political party campaigns are very influential agents for civic and voter education. It is the politicians who are very close to the community and the people who voted them to power. Civic and voter education is also provided by politicians to the public through seminars, public meetings, and political campaigns. Politicians normally have trust in the public and have the responsibility to pass information from their political parties, and the government machinery on certain issues related to voter education before and during the electoral process (Thesing and Hofmeister, 1995).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) represent the civil society community in the democratic process. There are many NGOs that are involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania after getting permission from the national electoral commission. NGOs have the advantage of being closer to the people at the grassroots than other agents of voter education; this gives them much trust in the public because they are community – based and hence have wide acceptance by the community. NGOs mostly use several methods like seminars, workshops, and the media to communicate with the public about political education though sometimes they are keenly regulated by the government in the fear to implement donors' interests and manipulate the electoral process activities (Mpangala, 2007).

The most important thing worth emphasizing here is that all the agents which have been involved in the dissemination of civic and voter education in Tanzania cannot generate their resources to conduct the exercise. The national Electoral Management Bodies

(EMBs) get funds from the government and other agents get their resources from external donors to perform the work. The EMBs also significantly depend on donors to efficiently provide civic and voter education because normally the amount disbursed from the government is not enough to cater for all the requirements of elections management and administration.

7.0 Findings and Discussion

The dissemination of civic and voter education to the electorate is the legal mandate of the EMBs in Tanzania as per the national elections law (1985), and Article 334 Section 4C of the 1977 constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. EMBs conduct the activity, regulate, supervise, and coordinate other actors participating in the exercise. The lack of funds from the government makes the EMBs in the country unable to exercise their constitutional powers in this particular role.

The debilitating nature of EMBs in this area allowed other donor – funded actors like NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education to the electorate. The dependency of both the EMBs and NGOs makes donors' involvement in this area indispensable. This section analyses the systematic role and influence of donors' support in the dissemination of civic and voter education in the Tanzania electoral processes from 1995 to 2020.

In the first 1995 multiparty general elections, the EMBs requested a total of Tshs. 44 billion from the government. The government approved Tshs. 37 billion and provided only Tshs. 21 billion which equals 78% and donors contributed Tshs. 8.5 billion which equals 22% of the total election costs. A group of six (6) foreign donors financed twenty – two (22) local NGOs not only to disseminate civic and voter education but also to carry out mobilization campaigns at various levels in the electoral process.

Omari (1995) noted that some of the programs carried out by local NGOs were multimillion dollar programs in nature, while others were

medium – size grants dished out to local NGOs to conduct workshops and seminars on democratization and the electoral process in particular. In any case, the donors', whether local or foreign, aim to influence the voters' behaviour through the dissemination of civic and voter education. Seminars, workshops, conferences, study groups, and research and mobilization systems were established and they carried out their activities before and during the election campaigns. Although in principle, the donor – funded NGOs were supposed to remain neutral in the process, the experience proves the contrary. Evidence suggests that some NGOs dedicated to civic and voter's education provisions in the 1995 elections were campaigning openly for one particular party. Other NGOs representatives in the field turned out to be political activists and campaigners for certain political parties, most of them favouring the opposition parties.

For instance, it was reported that with the same motive representatives of the Women's Council of Tanzania (BAWATA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), Zanzibar Electoral Monitoring Committee (ZEMOG), and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT) - Democracy division campaigned for the NCCR – Mageuzi party in Dar es Salaam, Singida, and in various parts of Tanzania. They were convinced by the foreign donors' attitude that regime change was necessary and the opposition party led by Mr. Augustine Mrema (NCCR-MAGEUZI) was the answer to their quest for change (NEC, 1997).

Association for Regional Integration of Eastern and Southern Africa (ARIESA) campaigned for an opposition party CHADEMA in Dar es Salaam, notably in the Kawe constituency, and ARIESA was headed by Mr. Eric Mchatta who contested the Kawe constituency parliamentary seat through CHADEMA. Similarly, PORIS campaigned for NCCR-MAGEUZI in Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, and Ruvuma Regions. It was also true that PORIS was headed by Mr. Prince Bagenda who contested the Muleba South

constituency parliamentary seat through NCCR-MAGEUZI (NEC, 1997).

The evidence presented above indicates that some of the NGOs representatives were activists, and were against the ruling party CCM in general because of its alleged corrupt past and inefficiency in governance. Their inclination to favour the opposition parties was not a surprise to any student of Tanzania's political development. The donors who funded the NGOs wanted the elections to bring changes in the government as their motive for supporting the overall project of democratization in Tanzania. Chaligha and Limbu (1996) claimed that in the 1995 elections, foreign donors supported the opposition parties in various ways to gain strength which would enable them to win the October 1995 general elections. Since this was the first Tanzania experiment to conduct multiparty elections supported by foreign donors', the donors were optimistic that the regime change was necessary for the country, even though it never happened.

In the same vein, Shivji (2007:19) supporting the above observation, suggests that NGOs' donor dependency has resulted in a situation where it is the donors who determine the survival of NGOs mentioned above. He writes: "An overwhelming number of NGOs are donor – funded. They do not have any independent sources of funding and have to seek donor funds through the usual procedures set by the funding agencies. While some NGOs may be quite involved and appreciated by the people whom they purport to serve, ultimately NGOs, by their very nature, derive not only their sustenance but also legitimacy from the donor community".

In the 2000 elections, the EMBs requested a sum of Tshs. 76.7 billion but the government approved Tshs. 39.8 billion and provided to EMBs only Tshs. 34.1 billion equal to 86% and donors contributed 5.7 billion equalling 14% of the entire elections' costs. The Donor Basket Group funded sixteen local NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education in these elections. This time around, the donors' refused to finance voters' education using public – owned media such

as Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam. Donors also did not finance voter education programs through television for two reasons: first, donors said that it was too expensive and only a few Tanzanians had access to television. Second, donors expected those media houses to conduct the programmes for free. The refusal of donors to finance the activity via public Radio and Television compelled the EMBs to use the government's inadequate funds to finance those programs. Later on, with the assistance of the Donor Basket Fund and the EU, EMBs were able to conduct civic and voters' education by using khanga carrying elections message, leaflets, posters, slogan dye, and the distribution of leaflets through the post office (direct mail marketing).

As explained above, while donors refused to support the EMBs, they financed voter mobilization activities through radio spots in privately – owned radio stations and newspapers from 10th July 2000. This situation indicates how donors had no trust in the commitment of the EMBs. However, later on, with assistance from USAID, the EMBs were able to conduct seminars with News Media, the Police Force, the Federation of Associations for the Disabled, and Political parties to educate them on election issues (NEC, 2001).

The above facts reveal a trend that even though EMBs needed much support from donors to conduct civic and voter education, donors' support for EMBs decreased while at the same time it increased for NGOs. This happened because donors' conditions to EMBs were too difficult to be implemented; thereafter donors directed their support to NGOs where they easily implemented their interests. It was posited by donors that NGOs have a further reaching impact on the provision of civic and voter education than EMBs. This is because NGOs are widespread in every part of Tanzania and are closer to the voters than the EMBs which are active only during the starting of the electoral process. Another reason is that EMBs are limited in terms of resources and human resources which are not present at the grassroots.

The above mentioned reasons were not the only obstacles that determined the relations of donors, EMBs, and NGOs for the 1995 and 2000 elections. Another critical factor that favoured donors' assistance to NGOs over to EMBs was the 2005 Amendments of the Law Section 4(C) added to the Election Act. No.1 of 1985. The amendments empowered the EMBs to prepare one guideline for all and to review guidelines used by NGOs to conduct civic and voter education. This meant that before 2005 donors determined the contents of civic and voters' education to recipient NGOs. This development was not well welcomed by donors who deliberately refused to finance voters' education conducted by the EMBs.

In the 2005 elections, the EMBs requested a total sum of Tshs. 88 billion from the government, whereas Tshs. 48.4 billion was for the general management and administration of elections including dissemination of civic and voter education, and Tshs. 39.6 billion was intended for the establishment of the Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR). The EMBs received from the government Tshs. 58.7 billion equal to 95%, and Tshs. 3.53 billion equal to 5% from donors. Then it followed that only a few NGOs, supported by donor basket funds conducted civic and voter education in the 2005 elections which did not cover the whole country. This happened because the donors did not like to fund activities not under their control. The civic and voter's education materials at this time included brochures, posters, leaflets, booklets, radio programs, cultural performances, songs, theatre performances, television programs, and other materials containing information related to voter's education (The Guardian, 05/09/2005; NEC, 2005; EISA, 2005).

In the 2010 elections, the EMBs requested from the government a total sum of Tshs. 151.8 billion but received from the government Tshs. 135. 6 billion equal to 89% and from donors the EMBs received 18.9 billion equal to 11% of the total election costs used. Donors through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) - Election Support Project (ESP) funded both the EMBs and sixty five (65) local

NGOs, which facilitated the dissemination of civic and voter education throughout the country.

Surprisingly, this time, the UNDP prepared its own civic and voters' education materials which were to be used by recipient NGOs who disseminated civic and voters' education in the 2010 elections. This time around enough funds were allocated to several local NGOs for the same activity because the donors controlled the contents of civic and voters' education materials. The UNDP issued guidelines on how interested organizations should apply for funding to disseminate civic and voter education in the elections.

This time, the funding of civic and voter education through the UNDP was a very competitive process whose management was contracted to a consulting firm called Delloite and Touche. This was done in order not only to avoid conflict of interest in the selection process but also to reduce the burden on donors for managing the 2010 Election Support Project coordinated by UNDP. However, the consulting firm extremely delayed the process to the extent that some NGOs either rescheduled or cancelled their programs for fear of ending with no impact. This contributed to the failure of reaching the target groups in rural areas.

Likewise, the UNDP through other implementing agencies such as the UNIFEM, and through women NGOs, trained over 350 women candidates in seven regions including Zanzibar on their role in the elections regardless of their political affiliation. Part of the training including election laws enhanced the knowledge of women on issues related to elections and civic and voter education. Also, with the support of UNDP, 125 community radio broadcasters were trained and 1,500 radio sets were distributed to various listening groups including the pastoralists. TAMWA and HAKI ELIMU utilized the media to sensitize the public about the 2010 elections. TAMWA designed media spots on TV that showed the qualities of a good leader and portrayed those women were also competent leaders (TEMCO, 2010; ESP, 2010; NEC, 2011).

The EMBs believe that donor – funded NGOs end up misusing the funds by doing their activities far from the electoral process activities. The Pastoralists Indigenous Non – Governmental Organization Forum (PINGOs) was stopped to function in Arusha by the Arusha Regional Commissioner for the allegation that it turned out to be an activist group, which was campaigning for a certain opposition political party in Arusha. Thus, such evidence tells how the government EMBs are afraid of donors' involvement in this area and suggests that when donors happen to empower NGOs with more funds than the EMBs, it means that the voters are likely to make an informed choice and change the regime in power.

It is thus clear that the conflicting interests between the donors and government become inevitable. The EMBs noted that many of the activities of the 43 NGOs funded by donors to disseminate civic and voter education on the mainland did not take place according to their informants and that some persons at the district level were not aware of the NGOs implementing the activities. This blame was caused by both (donors and EMBs). First, the difficulties were caused by Delloite and Touche consulting firm in disbursing the donor funds, in some cases, poor reporting on behalf of the NGOs, some activities were either postponed or some NGOs found themselves having to fund the activities to be later reimbursed. Secondly, on the other side, some NGOs claimed that the EMBs substantially delayed the approval of voter education materials which, in some cases, severely hampered the NGOs ability to carry out enough activities ahead of time for the general elections.

The government is still somewhat cautious of NGOs and suspects that they are a cover for opposition parties, donors' and other political interests as well as competitors for donors' funding. Interestingly, since the funds were sent directly from donors to local NGOs for civic and voter education provisions, it is not possible to state the exact amount of money received and spent on such programs and activities in all elections from 1995 to 2020. This situation raises much uncertainty about the credibility and trust of stakeholders

(Donors and NGOs) regarding their motives to participate in the electoral processes.

The NGOs are frequently accused by the government and EMBs of being briefcase organizations created with the sole intent of raising funds from foreign donors. It should be noted that the adoption of the NGO policy in 2001, followed by the 2002 Act, was partly due to pressure from donors' because donors' fund is now directed toward democratization (Iheme, 2005; Mogella in Kiondo and Nyang'oro, 2006). Likewise, the NGOs legal framework in Tanzania, like the NGO Act 2002 and the Societies Act Cap. 337 R.E. 2002, prohibit civil societies and non-government organizations from participating in political activities.

According to Shivji (2006:24), the term 'political activities' is unclear as applied in the above legal framework. The question will be where does politics start or end? Or is anything non – governmental or non – political? Shivji again answers this question by arguing that when NGOs accept being non – political they contribute to the process of mystification and, therefore, objectively side with the status quo contrary to their express stand for change. Since civic and voter education provision is a power game, it is no wonder that these organizations are strategically incapacitated by the government to participate in providing civic and voter education. It is also interesting to note that the EMBs were also sceptical of the documents of the Tanzania Episcopal Conference and Shura ya Maimamu Tanzania that aimed at providing civic education in the country before the October 2010 elections.

Baregu (2001) points out that empowering citizens through civic and voter education remains a contested terrain in Tanzania. Those in power, normally look at the exercise as something harmful to their existence while those outside the ruling powers, take the exercise as necessary for them to get support from the informed citizens. Pye (1997:246) notes that "since the play of politics almost invariably favours some people and hurts others, it, therefore, easily stimulates

suspicion and distrust". Seen from this perspective, the issue of power is central to the state of Tanzania through the EMBs' reluctance or willingness to provide civic and voter education, as the activity is ultimately a question of power itself (Riutta, 2007).

Therefore, the donors' intervention in this area has been very instrumental, especially in empowering the NGOs with much funding so that they may disseminate effective civic and voter education to the electorate, rather than channelling their support through EMBs, which will do the same activity in a biased way to favour the ruling party. In his critical article entitled 'Civic Competence and Participatory Democracy' Mhina (2009:100) raises an important question concerning the power and provision of civic and voter education in Tanzania. In a power relationship between 'A' and 'B', when 'A' has power and 'B' does not, the question is whether we can expect that someone or an institution would empower an individual or group that would reduce its power. The logic of this analogy is quite telling when the donors decide to fund civic and voters' education, it is not uncommon to find that the same will determine its content, structure, timing, place, and actors.

This explains why the donors have been reluctant to cooperate with EMBs in the selection of NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education. The obvious reason is that the ruling party benefits enormously from state instruments and resources to remain in power. In this situation, the ruling party via EMBs does whatever it can to monopolize power through, among other things, defining 'what is voter's education, what is not, and who should provide voter's education to the electorate. The above state of affairs reveals that the influence of donors in this area was quite significant and was seen especially in the contents of voter's education and the selection of actors to provide civic and voter's education. The recipients' NGOs were obliged to use the voter's education materials supplied by donors to disseminate civic and voter education.

Reflecting on this matter, in his critical article entitled '*Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What we are, what we are not, and what we ought to be'* Shivji (2004: 689), argues that "Whoever pays the piper calls the tune' still holds, however much we may want to think otherwise. In many direct and subtle ways, those who fund us determine or place limits on our agendas or reorient them. Very few of us can really resist the pressures that external funding imposes on us". Therefore, the EMBs' refusal to use donors' guidelines led to the donors' withdrawing their support for EMBs. The donors deliberately opted to provide many funds to NGOs where their interests could be implemented easily.

In some instances, donors' support to NGOs did not help to effectively inform the potential voters because the recipients' NGOs operated under the influence of partisanship, which is beyond the donors' reach. As such, when this happened, the NGOs operated like activist groups campaigning for certain political parties; thus, became harshly treated by the government EMBs and seriously hampered the efficiency of the civic and voter education program in the electoral processes. Likewise, another factor noted beyond partisanship influence, was NGOs self – motives as revealed in the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA) case of the 2010 elections. This situation contributed to the limited provision of civic and voter education to the electorate.

The situation in the 2015 elections was slightly different compared to what happened in the previous elections as discussed above. This time around the government changed its approach because of the bitter experience of depending largely on donor funds to finance the dissemination of civic and voter education. Donor dependency syndrome largely contributed to the mismanagement of the exercise and disruptions of electoral activity schedules to provide civic and voter education. Donor funds were either deliberately delayed or provided in less amounts than the amount pledged by bilateral and multilateral donors.

In the 2015 elections, the government responded timely unlike in the previous elections. The EMBs requested a total amount of Tshs. 273,648,993,370/= and received a total sum of Tshs. 273, 634,130,372/=, which is equivalent to 99.99% of all the funds requested by the EMBs for the management and administration of elections. Surprisingly, donors contributed to the EMBs a total of Tshs. 1, 523,886, 833/= equivalent to 0.01% of the total elections' costs, and the same donors provided Tshs 62.26 billion to 211 NGOs for civic and voter education dissemination. The reason why donors' generosity decreased to the EMBs and increased to NGOs is puzzle (THRDC, 2015; NEC, 2016).

In these specific elections, the EMBs managed, to a large extent, to disseminate civic and voter education effectively despite the raised complaints that some areas like the Maasai lands, Rukwa, Iringa, and Pemba had a big number of people who participated in the elections without getting civic and voter education (TACCEO, 2015; EU,2015). The EMBs had a strategic focus on how civic and voter education will be provided in cooperation with other non – government organizations and institutions which applied to participate in the exercise. The EMBs prepared ethical guidelines to guide other stakeholders who wanted to provide civic and voter education in the elections. In this respect, all non – government organizations and institutions which got accredited to disseminate civic and voter education were obliged to follow the guidelines and ethics of the EMBs.

A total number of 451 non – governmental organizations applied but only 447 institutions qualified and were accredited to disseminate civic and voter education in various parts of Tanzania in the 2015 elections. However, CSOs' role was highly affected by the fact that only a few numbers of CSOs received funds from donors for election programs. The number of CSOs with funded election programs was not above 200 out of 30,000 CSOs in Tanzania (THRDC, 2015). The total amount of resources granted to 211 CSOs in Tanzania in the 2015 elections was 28.3 million USD, equivalent to Tshs. 62.26

billion. Together with this amount of funds dedicated to civic and voter education, still there were complaints that the provision of civic and voter education did not reach every part of Tanzania.

This poses a question about the motive of the local CSOs and the donors who provide a lot of resources to non – governmental entities and not to the mandated national EMBs to conduct the exercise. This is where the conflict of interest happens and this is between the donors and the government EMBs concerning the management of electoral activities which if left to external control the influence is always harmful. Local CSOs and NGOs complain every time that the funds were not enough but the resources, they get are huge but mismanaged by paying for very lucrative seminars and workshops rather than using the funds to reach the voters through cheap techniques to disseminate civic and voter education. There are also complaints from local CSOs that a large amount of foreign funds and resources were awarded to a few foreign NGOs. The actual total amount of resources granted to 211 local CSOs in Tanzania was 28.3 million USD, equivalent to Tshs. 62.26 Billion out of 21,128.3 million USD which was given by donors.

This explains why the EMBs are very sceptical of civic and voter education provided by non – governmental stakeholders because of the resource scramble among the beneficiaries. The recent threat to local CSOs resulted due to an increase of UN Agencies, International NGOs, and some donors assuming the role of domestic CSOs during elections by conducting training and seminars on civic and voter education in the 2015 elections. One UN Agency that is blamed to have done the electoral activities which were to be done by domestic CSOs in 2015 was UNDP.

UNDP secured election grants from foreign donors based in Tanzania such as CIDA, SDC, DANIDA, etc. UNDP under the Democratization Empowering Program Managed to solicit about 22 million dollars from Dar es Salaam – based foreign donors. This practice affected many CSOs who expected to receive such grants

from the same source that channelled election funds to UN Agencies such as UNDP and UN Women.

On the other side, the Foundation for Civil Society despite the little sum of elections funds they had, supported more than 50% of all 200 CSOs which received elections grants in the 2015 elections. Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC) findings indicate that out of USD 28 Million allocated for CSOs, not more than 10% was used by local CSOs. The majority of CSOs have raised their concerns that international NGOs and UN agencies are increasingly replacing their space during elections. More than 50% of all 211 supported CSOs were supported by the Foundation for Civil Society which acted as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of other actors in the exercise.

In these specific elections, the key methods used in the dissemination of civic and voter education included the following; first, conducting public meetings with elections stakeholders like religious leaders, political parties, media news editors, women, youth, and people with disabilities. Second, using television and Radio broadcasting where the EMBs experts provided explanations regarding elections issues such as elections laws, registration of voters in the permanent voter register, elections ethics, candidates' nominations, elections campaigns, voting regulations, counting, and advertising of the results. A total number of ten TV stations and 47 community radios got involved in the exercise.

Third, Websites and social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and hulkshare were used to create civic awareness. Fourth, EMBs prepared posters carrying election messages which were displayed in various places in big cities to educate voters. Fifth, a communication centre was prepared by the EMBs to allow direct communication between the voters and the EMBs concerning election issues. This centre was launched on 12th October 2015 and closed on 30th October 2015 where about 78,911 calls from the voters were received

and clarifications and actions were taken to address the challenges which emerged in various places.

The above discussion revealed that, to a large extent, civic and voter education was disseminated in the 2015 elections because the EMBs had significant resources to conduct the exercise compared to previous elections. This emphasizes the importance of the government to treat well the electoral process internally as a sensitive exercise not to be controlled by external actors (donors) as it happened in the previous elections. The EMBs controlled the content of civic and voter education and had the power to choose which NGOs to participate in and what to be disseminated to the voters.

"Election management can efficiently and effectively (professionally) be executed if adequate funds are secured on time" (Chaligha, 2010: 403). The 2020 multiparty general elections were the first to be conducted without any foreign donors' support to the EMBs. This makes a sharp difference from the experience of the previous elections of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 which significantly received foreign funds. The lack of adequate funds compelled the EMBs to depend on foreign support to finance the dissemination of civic and voter education. This tendency gave donors more influence on how the exercise was conducted. In 2020 the government was well prepared as it prepared and set aside a total amount of Tshs. 331,858,287,981.00/= dedicated for elections purposes. During the implementation time the EMBs requested a total amount of Tshs. 268, 493,380,671.00/=, and the government disbursed timely the entire amount as requested. This was to enable the EMBs to handle effectively the management and administration of elections.

Surprisingly, the EMBs used only a total amount of Tshs. 262,493,380,671.00/= to complete all election activities including dissemination of civic and voter education. The remaining total amount of Tshs. 6,000,000,000.00/= was returned to the national treasury. This is a piece of open evidence that the EMBs had

sufficient funds and did not face any financial challenge in carrying out their constitutional mandate. Elections costs declined due to the use of the government electronic tendering process (TANePS) which enhanced transparency and increased competition between tenderers which decreased elections costs (NEC, 2021:45).

The EMBs accredited 28 CSOs to disseminate civic and voter education during the exercise of updating the permanent national voter register (PNVR). In the general elections, 252 CSOs were accredited, but surprisingly only 107 CSOs participated successfully in the exercise (NEC 2021). The methods used by the EMBs and other actors to disseminate civic and voter education included the use of media, i.e. radio and television talk shows and interviews, newspapers, EMBs websites, social networks, civil society organisations, special cars with PA systems, leaflets, brochures, billboards, participation in various national exhibitions, stakeholders' meetings, public commuter posters, banners, arts and numerous publications, official and informal gatherings. Civic and voter education programs on radio, televisions and newspapers started earlier during the period of updating the PNVR and throughout the time of general elections campaigns (REDET 2021; NEC 2021).

The new act, Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 3 of 2019 introduced new requirements which required donor – funded NGOs to submit their contractual agreements with foreign donors and also excluded faith – based organisations from participating in the elections. Following the implementation of the law, the giant and experienced NGOs in the country failed to secure EMBs' accreditation. The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition THRDC, Tanzania Election Monitoring Group (TEMCO), and the Tanzania Constitution Forum (TCF) (REDET 2021). The exclusion of many CSOs from the process of deregistering and freezing bank accounts of large civil society coalitions created a huge vacuum of NGOs with financial power and competent human resources to participate in the elections.

Tanzania Elections Watch initiative (TEW) was established to fill the gap between excluded domestic and international actors. TEW was organised and coordinated by Kituo cha Katiba: Eastern Africa Centre for Constitutional Development (KcK) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) (TEW 2021). The EMBs wanted the CSOs to disclose their sources of funds to participate in the elections. EMBs and the government were suspicious of there being a hidden agenda of mismanaging the whole exercise as it happened in the previous elections. In support of the EMBs' decisions, Kendra and Aseem (2022:189) argue that "A common criticism is that NGOs dependence on foreign funds is more responsive to donors' concerns as opposed to the needs of the communities they serve. This means that the local community views NGOs as advocating for issues that are important to Western audiences and not to local people. Second, even the public goods that NGOs supply may not be of the appropriate type – a common criticism of foreign aid".

As stated above, this time the EMBs did not only have sufficient funds but also had full control of the contents to be disseminated and which actors should participate in the exercise. The EMBs and other accredited civil society organisations provided the same content of civic and voter education throughout the country (NEC 2021:94). The availability of enough funds to the EMBs denied donors influence in the exercise and donors became spectators as they had no means to intervene in the exercise. The report of the EMBs emphasizes that the provision of civic and voter education was successfully done in the 2020 elections. This increased the number of voters registered in the PNVR to 29,754,699 which is an increase of about 6,593,259 voters compared to 23,161,440 voters registered in the 2015 elections. EMBs count the exercise as successful as the number of voters who voted on the Election Day was 15,091,950, equal to 50.72% of the total voters registered. The number of spoiled votes was only 1.739% which represents only 261,755 registered voters, and the votes which were okay were 14,830,195 equals 98.27% of total votes (NEC 2021).

However, the REDET observation report opined that civic and voter education provided by EMBs and other CSOs did not cover the whole country as they commented that "In general, TEMCO/REDET observed that there were limited voter education campaigns in many districts in the country in the process of updating the voter register. An overwhelming number of the LTOs (79%) reported that they did not witness any CSO conducting voter education in their respective areas. Only 36 per cent of the LTOs witnessed some voter education campaign activities conducted largely by NEC/ZEC in certain parts of the country through TV, radio, and posters. This limited voter education was provided through radio (53%), TV (27%), and leaflets and brochures (21%). Also, there was hardly any voter education specifically tailored for special groups" (REDET 2021:116). There is a general criticism that the content of civic and voter education provided in the past elections focused on directing the voters to listen carefully to elections campaigns and choose the candidate of their choice without linking the candidate to the political party. This message applies to a situation of one political party and not in the era of multiparty politics.

Pius Msekwa points out that "voter education is primarily intended to enhance the voters' awareness of the true meaning of the outcomes which may result from his vote, to enable him to vote wisely and in a way that will achieve the kind of outcome which will be of maximum benefit to the country's governance system" (Daily News 03/09/2020). This should be considered and taken into practice by the EMBs and other actors who would be involved in the exercise to provide meaningful civic and voter education to voters in the forthcoming general elections in Tanzania.

8.0 Conclusion

The responsibility to disseminate civic and voter education to the public is principally vested in the national EMBs in Tanzania. Civil society organizations and non – governmental *organizations* got involved in this role when they got accreditation from EMBs. The intervention of donor support has been inevitable in the Tanzanian

electoral process especially in the dissemination of civic and voter education to the electorate because the agents involved in the exercise such as NGOs, CSOs, and EMBs largely depended on financial and material support from donors to conduct the exercise. In response, donors made their support available and had significant influence from the 1995 to 2010 elections, where they controlled the contents of civic and voter education materials and the choice of actors.

This happened because the EMBs lacked enough funds to exercise the constitutional mandate. In 2015 the EMBs had a significant amount of resources and in the 2020 elections, the EMBs had sufficient funds from the government and, to a large extent, it controlled the exercise unlike in the previous elections. The involvement of other actors in the exercise such as the mass media, political parties, and CSOs as indicated above to complement the weakness of the government EMBs, raises some issues of concern to understanding their motive behind and if the exercise will not be manipulated for their interest and donor influence.

9.0 Recommendation

This study makes the following recommendations: First it should be understood that elections are a fundamental part of the domestic political processes. Donors need to recognize that their role is limited, as is their influence on the process or results. Secondly, all actors in the electoral process in the country need to carefully revisit their engagement with donors. Foreign donors' always have their interests which must well be studied before the aid they give is accepted. The best way of doing this is by developing self – reliant initiatives to avoid increasing their dependency on overseas support. Thirdly, the EMBs should adhere to Elections Acts which require the establishment of elections consolidated funds to ensure availability of funds during election time. Lastly, the study recommends that foreign aid recipient actors should be transparent in their financial matters. This can be done by declaring openly the funds received whether from local or foreign sources and how funds were used. This would help to curb corruption, dubious foreign influence, and motives

infiltrating through recipients and which can be harmful to the country and its sovereignty.

10.0 Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to all institutions and individuals who agreed to conduct fruitful interviews which gave quality raw data and those who made available the documentary sources, scholarly contributions, and insights that assisted the completion of this study.

1. Six donors who financed 22 NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education in the 1995 elections were Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, The Netherlands, and European Commission.

2. The 22 institutions which received foreign support to disseminate civic and voter education in the 1995 elections were IDS (Institute of Development Studies (UDSM), Survival Africa Trust, Tanzania Information Services (MAELEZO), TGNP (Tanzania Gender Networking Programme) TAMWA (Tanzania Media Women Association), BAWATA (Women's Council of Tanzania) BAKWATA (The Muslim Council of Tanzania), Institute of Adult Education, The Tanzania Arts Council (BASATA), Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA), Tanzania Federation of Trade Unions (TFTU), African International Group of Political Risk Analysis (PORIS), Christian Professionals of Tanzania (CPT), Christian Social Services Commissions (CSSC)-CCT& Tanzania Episcopal Conferences (TEC) and Association for Regional Integration of Eastern and Southern Africa (ARIESA), TEMCO, ZEMOG, The Tanzania Professionals, ESAURP, Tanzania Association of Non- Government Organization and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (Democracy Division).

3. The Donor Basket Group funded sixteen local NGOs to disseminate civic and voter education in the 2000 elections. The following 12 countries were included; Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, USA (USAID).

4. The 16 local NGOs which received foreign support to disseminate civic and voter education in the 2000 elections were LHRC, TGNP,

WLAC, SAHRINGON, TAMWA, ForDIA, LEAT, Policy Forum, TANLAP, MPI, HAKIMADINI, ACCORD, TAHURIFO, TLF, YPC, ZLSC, and WiLDAF.

5. NGOs that received support from donor basket fund to conduct civic and voter education in the 2005 elections which did not cover the whole country were the Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania – BAKWATA, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), Umbrella Organization for Disabilities in Tanzania, (SHIVYAWATA), Information Centre for Disabilities (ICD), National Consortium on Civic Education in Tanzania, (NACOCET), Tanzania Council of Social Development (TACOSODE), Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), and Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC).

6. The donor countries that contributed to the 2005 Elections Basket included Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as well as UNDP. The USAID supported the costs of printing all the civic and voter's education materials.

7. Donors through the UNDP Election Support Project (ESP) funded both the EMBs and sixty-five (65) local NGOs. Some of the NGOs which played a great role in the dissemination of civic and voter education for the 2010 elections were TAMWA, HAKIELIMU, LHRC, TGNP, and TAWLA.

8. According to Taj, H & Frederick, A. S (2009) and Jinmi, (2013), "Brief-case Organizations" refers to NGOs which have been set up for unethical ends; they function mainly to try to attract grants or donations to enrich their owners. Sometimes are called "Unethical NGOs" which tend to exploit people's giving nature and weaken the trust of the public and donors in the NGO sector. MONGOS and PONGOS – "My NGO or Pocket NGOs": these also are briefcase NGOs founded for tax evasion or private gain.

   The distinction is that the MONGOs, "my Own NGOs", are created solely to serve the interest of one person who features at large in every consideration, while PONGOs are pocket NGOs that serve a cabal, or limited criteria of people. FONGOS: these are NGOs that

exist largely on paper but can be used to source or attract funds. NGOs in this category often have a fictional structure that exists in law but without structural content.

9. *Shura ya Maimamu Tanzania, Kamati Kuu ya Siasa, Kuelekea Uchaguzi Mkuu 2010, Juni, 2009, Dar es Salaam*.

10. Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), Manifesto, Proposal of National Priorities, Justice and Peace, Dar es *Salaam* (No date).

11. See the Speech by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa, at the Opening of the Ninth Conference on the State of Politics in Tanzania, Nkrumah Hall, University of Dar es Salaam, 10th May 2001.

12. Donors who funded CSOs to conduct civic and voter education in the 2015 elections included Open Society Foundation for East Africa (OSIEA), UN-Women, OXFAM; Foundation for Civil Society, SIDA, DANIDA, Finish Local Cooperation, Swiss Development Cooperation, Tanzania Women Fund (WFT), Tanzania Media Foundation (TMF), UNDP and USAID. One of the main donors who supported a big number of CSOs in 2015 is Foundation for Civil Society (FCS).

13. There are also complaints from local CSOs that a large amount of foreign funds and resources were awarded to a few NGOs and some were foreign. The actual total amount of resources granted to 211 CSOs in Tanzania was 28.3 million USD equivalent to Tshs. 62.26 Billion out of 21,128.3 million USD which was given by donors in the 2015 elections. The skewed distribution was as follows; Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) 1,121.4 million, OSIEA 51.4 million, DANIDA 260,000 million, SIDA undisclosed, CIDA Unknown 500,000 million, Oxfam – Tanzania 56 million USD, UNESCO Undisclosed, UN-Women 92.4 million, SDC 1 2. Million, USAID 149 million, UNDP Undisclosed, DFID 615 million, Total 21,128.3 million.

14. Some of the involved stations in 2015 to disseminate civic and voter education included Tanzania Broad Casting Cooperation (TBC 1), Azam TV, Channel Ten, Clouds FM, Micheweni FM, Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), East African TV, Voice of America

(straight talk Africa), BBC (focus on Africa), Independent Tanzania Television (ITV) and Star TV.

15. Some institutions which were accredited by the EMBs to provide civic and voter education in the 2020 elections include the University of Dar es Salaam, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), Tanzania Cross Party-Platform (T-WCP Ulingo), and the University of Dar es Salaam, Institute of Development Studies, Action for Change (Acha), the Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), the Dar es Salaam University College of Education (Duce) and the Tanzania Youth Coalition (TYC). The list omitted all of the main human rights organizations such as the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition, the Legal and Human Rights Centre, the Tanzania Constitution Forum (Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania), and the Tanzania Episcopal Conference.

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Book Review
Reviewer: Lucy Shule

African Security: An Introduction,

New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Plc. March 2020.
Authors: John Siko and Jonah Victor
Pp xi+266, ISBN: 978-1-78831-742-9.

African Security: An Introduction provides a detailed account of an area that is rarely published. As such, it complements African security academic discourse. The book's overall content covers the rich history and practice of African security. In addition to explaining the current African security, the book provides an exposition of the pre – colonial security situation and envisages the future. Even though the authors emphasise that they do not intend to address theoretical – cum – academic issues, the content of the book brings out aspects that challenge existing academic debates on African security.

The main text is divided into three main sections, with a total of 13 chapters, including an overview and a conclusion; the prospects of the latter project for African security and policy options. Part One, which mainly comprises chapters 1 to 4 (pp. 1–52), introduces the book and presents three perspectives that focus on Africa's geopolitics and security challenges. The authors' approach combines experience in both government and corporate sectors with key concepts and analytical frameworks and links them to the understanding of security issues that have continued to inform Africa's history.

The three chapters after the introduction discuss pre – colonial conflicts, in particular southern African liberation struggles. In addition, they also highlight the issue of peace and war in independent Africa, including the geopolitics of North Africa. Chapter Four focuses on North Africa's relations with the rest of Africa, the Middle East, and its role in Africa's security challenges.

Interlude A (pp. 53–98) dwells on identity, armed forces, religious extremism as well as crime and law enforcement in Africa.

The section looks mainly into Africa's armed forces, aware of the fact that they not only influence the security environment but also act as key players in addressing Africa's security challenges. Furthermore, in this section the authors examine the role of religion and religious ideologies in Africa; and analyse the emergence of extremism, terrorist activities, and interreligious conflict. Lastly, this part looks into crime and law enforcement in Africa, particularly the nature of the crime, organized crime, and criminal organisations as well as law enforcement.

Interlude B (pp. 101-188) is specifically structured to guide those who intend to travel or live in Africa for work, business, or any other professional reasons. It comprises six chapters and adopts an anticipatory framework. The chapters are designed to address issues such as anticipating and responding to military coups, anticipating and mitigating election violence, anticipating and preparing for the economic crisis in Africa as well as managing and ending conflicts in Africa. This section concludes by examining the influence and competition of external actors, and future trends in African security, and also suggests policy options.

A notable strength of the book is the authors' proficiency in documenting African security, making it better understood within the global security context. The authors have managed to write a comprehensive account of African security on issues that have over time been treated in isolation: African international relations, conflict resolution, migrations, peacekeeping, crime, law enforcement, militaries, economic crises, identity, religions, and religious extremism, and geopolitics. This style is largely complemented by a combination of factors, including the authors' academic background and experience in both government and corporate sectors. The breadth and depth of the discussion are contributed to by the fact that both authors have pursued doctorate studies on African affairs and

worked in analytic, diplomatic, and policy planning in the US government. In addition, both have lectured courses on African security at undergraduate and postgraduate levels.

However, one of the major shortcomings of this book emanates from the absence of a discussion on gender relations in African security. Either the authors have disregarded the aspect, overlooked this fact, or were influenced by the general perception that it falls under the 'men's domains. How women have continued to play a key role in African security from the pre – colonial to post – independence period deserved specific attention in the book. For example, during the Mozambican liberation struggles, FRELIMO established a women's detachment in 1967 whereby, the first group was trained in Nachingwea – Tanzania. Women also transported food and ammunition, and also mobilised the youth into the struggle. Besides, some great women leaders such as Queen Anna Nzinga of Ndombo and Matamba waged war against the Portuguese invasion for almost 30 years, and she is recorded to be one of the skilled negotiators, military leaders, and tactful politicians.

On another note, the authors seem to have been influenced by the negativities that have often been associated with African security. For instance, they argue that they do not focus on the negative aspects of African security that Africa has often been identified with, which according to them, will limit their anticipation of the political, economic, and security developments but on the ground the book largely dwells on security challenges facing Africa. This might have been influenced by the curriculum design and content as the publication is a collection and synthesis of lecture notes, research and lessons learned. Chapter Two, for instance, discusses "African insecurity before independence" which suggests that security threats dominated pre – independence Africa. This leads to an understanding of African security only through the lens of insecurity, which is a negative perception. The same applies to most of the other chapters, and more so in four out of the six chapters of Interlude B. It is important to highlight that there have been positive trends in African

security. Notable ones include the formation of the Sahara Desert in 5,000$_{BCE}$ (approximately 7,000 years ago), which shaped Africa's civilisations, economics, politics, trade, and ecosystem. In addition, the emergence of the city-states – even before the formation of the Greek City States – which evolved in the 8th century $_{BCE}$ around 5,500 years ago, also coincided with the formation of the Sahara Desert.

Lastly, the authors have either generalised or overlooked to appreciate the fact that external interventions in Africa invariably impact African security. They range from the colonial policies that transfigured inter and intra Africa security relations to those of post – independence with international financial institutions, including the 'dependency syndrome' that has continued to impact African security.

Generally, the book remains a substantial reference not only to experts and those interested in African security but also to academicians. It serves as a foundation for understanding the details of African security, especially so during this time when Africa is dominating the world's affairs and the shift from the traditional to contemporary approaches to security studies.

Guideline for Contributors and Journal Policy

ISSN 2773-658X ONLINE & ISSN 2773-6598 PRINT

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A. In-text citations

APA uses the 'author-date' style of referencing. That is, in-text references (generally) appear in the following format: (Author's Last Name, Year of Publication).

..... toward class and other students (Weinstein, 2007).

Author as part of the text, the year of publication in parenthesis.

Malisa (2004) further stressed that it is evident...

When directly quoting from a source, you must include the page number(s) and enclose the quote in double quotation marks.

Example: "A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction" (Woolf, 1929, p. 6).

Note: For multiple pages, use the abbreviation 'pp.' Include the full-page range, i.e. '64-67'. Example: Woolf (1929, pp. 64-67) observes that…

The following are examples of citing from two authors: Cite both names each time the reference appears in the text. Do not use et al.

Emmanuel and Rose (2008) further stressed that it is evident...

Authors and year in parenthesis, use the symbol '&' to separate the authors, followed by a comma to separate the year.

...livestock keepers and crop farmers (Ismaeel & Ahmed, 2009).

The following are examples of citing from three and more authors:

Cite all the names of the authors the first time you cite.

Kimaro, Joseph, and Moureen (2006) pointed out that...

Cite the same three and more authors within the same paragraph. In this situation, cite the first author followed by et al. and exclude the year.

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Kimaro et al. (2006) discovered...

Some examples of Chicago footnotes/endnotes style;
In Chicago style, footnotes or endnotes are used to reference pieces of work in the text.

To cite from a source a superscript number is placed after a quote or a paraphrase. Citation numbers should appear in sequential order.

If using endnotes, numbered notes will appear on a separate, endnotes page at the end of your document and before the bibliography page. The page should be titled Notes (centered at the top). Footnotes must appear at the bottom of the page where they are referred.

Example
Political advisors were confident in their point-lead[1].

Foot/Endnote
Newton Minow and Craig LaMay, *Inside the Presidential Debates: Their Improbable Past and Promising Future,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 24-25.

Footnotes/Endnotes are paired together with a bibliography at the end of the research publication.

B. Some Common Referencing Formats

Journal Article:
Guion, R.M. (1973). A note on organizational climate. O*rganizational Behaviour and Human Performance,* 9(1), 120 – 125.

Book:
Schein, E.H. (1980). *Organizational psychology* (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall**.**

Article or Chapter in Book:
Guion, R.M. (1991). Personnel assessment, selection, and replacement. In M.D. Dunnet & L.M. Hough (Eds.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 327 - 397). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Dissertation or Thesis:
Mauer, K.F. (***1976***). *The assessment of human resources utilization*. Unpublished D Com Thesis. Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.

From the Internet:
United Nations. (2002). *New marketing strategies* [online]. Available at: http://www.admar.com/marketing2001/ (Accessed 10 December 2002).

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